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Europeand ChinaCompared*

An Essay-Review

Eric Mielants
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Chinese
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growthand
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experienced
thetraditional
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(Eurochallenges
to
believe
who
continue
scientists
of
social
Western
centric)
position
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tooccurinEurope(2000:
enableda take-off
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thanelsewhere
in
if
the
Industrial
Revolution
as
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Pomeranz
features.
bleevent,duetoitsuniqueinternal
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goingovertheavailableliterature
or
natural
pathto
teleological
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to
attempt
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uniqueness)
priorto 1800.He undermines
within
of
the
the
"rise
of
the
West"
(or emergence capitalism
explain
Europe)bysolelylookingat Europe(e.g.,Bois,2000; Lachmann,
and
in termsofcultural
2000)orbyexplaining
Europe'sadvantage
to
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region(e.g.,Park,1995).
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out
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points thatEuropewasnotthemotorbehind
thatthereexisted
worldhistory
beforetheIndustrial
Revolution,
tradein the
of
world
domination
to
coresprior Europe's
multiple
modandthattheseareaswereallexperiencing
nineteenth
century,
as well.In hiswords
estpercapitagrowth
themostdevelopedpartsof westernEuropeseemto have
cornsharedcrucialeconomicfeaturescommercialization,
ofgoods,land,andlabor,market-driven
modification
growth,
andlaboralloofbothfertility
andadjustment
byhouseholds
withotherdensely
cationtoeconomictrendspopulatedcore
areasin Eurasia(Pomeranz,
2000:107).
Pomeranz
of theliterature,
In his carefuland thorough
overview
butunlikeFrank(1998),heatdebunksEurocentric
myths,
rightfully
as a
theera beforethenineteenth
century
temptsto re-evaluate
center"
no
dominant
world
with
(Pomerfundamentally
"polycentric
anz,2000:4, 273).
analfromworld-systems
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Pomeranzdistances
Although
access
and
ofnon-Europeansthat"theexploitation
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overseascoercionandindustrialization"
talism,
thevisiblehandsof
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political-economic
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combined
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interstate
competition,
[which]made European
(forEurope)globalconjunctures,
relations
withtherestoftheworldunique
British)
(especially
(2000:185)
relationships
amongcore-periphery
to
thanheseemswilling
comesclosertotheworld-systems
paradigm
admit.
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LikeWallerstein
(2000:187)is quitecritical
(1983),Pomeranz
of
dismissal
O'Brien's(1990) outright
Europeanprofits
generated
outsideofEurope,andlikeWallerstein
(1974) theconquestofthe
withNewWorld(inturn"theresultofintensemilitary
competition
in Europe")is consideredto be crucialto explainEurope'srise
insists
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Pomeranz
2000:282).Moreimportantly,
(Pomeranz,
between
differences
fundamental
of
the
on
Europeanimportance
and therelationsChinahad withitsown
dominatedperipheries,
(2000:255,267,289).
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to
foritsefforts
bookshouldbe appreciated
WhilePomeranz's
of the nonand importance
underscoreonce more the vitality
in
socioeconomic
terms
of
arena
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sometimes
sinceworld-systems
analysis
developmentsof
the
and
the
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increasing
fromthe
isnevertheless
arena-thestudy
ratedexternal
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China
was
limitations
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constraints
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geopolitical)
hand,and theagencyandpolicychoicesmadebyelites,in theface
on theother,haveto be taken
and externalchallenges
ofinternal
thedifferent
intoaccountin orderto comprehend
political/ecoit
ofEuropeandChinainthelongrun.Although
nomictrajectories
the
of
either
to
dismiss
in
has latelybeen vogue
impact European
influence
to a verylimitedperiodin time(e.g.,Frank,1998)or to
because
it(mainly)
toa military/
attribute
breakthrough
technological
ofthe
to tracetheroots
I willattempt
oftheIndustrial
Revolution,1
1Pomeranzalso
as thewatershed
thatultimately
Revolution
regardstheIndustrial
theworld,and in variouspartsof hisbookhe discussesthedebateson
transformed
withthe
(2000).The obsessionofequatingmodernity
developments
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centuries.Onlyby
greatdivergencein the thirteenth-fifteenth
and
of
China
at
the
historical
Europein thelong
trajectory
looking
run(fromc. 1200on) canone assessthespecific
trajectodivergent
at play.2
ries(or pathdependencies)
THE CHINESESOCIOECONOMIC REVOLUTION
DURINGTHE SUNGDYNASTIES(C. 900-1280).
thatthescaleoftrade
inclaiming
Pomeranzis ofcoursecorrect
in Asiaweredazofgoodsexchanged
networks
and themultitude
mostofthepremodern
zlingwhencomparedtoEuropethroughout
tookto theseasin
Chinese
the
era(2000).Fromthetenthcentury,
somescholars
numbers
with
junksof200 tons.Although
increasing
were
thatmostly
havesuggested
bythe
luxury
products transported
intheIndianOcean(e.g.,Lewis,1978:XI,462),
Chinesemerchants
amounts
itappearsthatalreadyundertheSungdynasty
significant
and
ofbulkgoodssuchas "rice,porcelain,
pepper,lumber, mineroverseas(Shiba,1983:104).3DuringtheSung,
als"weretransported
hadbecome
in
andleasesofvesselservices
ventures
shipping
joint
and
of
commenda
"forms
"quitecommon"(Deng,1997a:102),and
the
societasmaris"alsocameintouse (Shiba,1983:108).Although
anunfortuIndustrial
Revolution
(e.g.,Vries,2001:435;Vries,2002:122,126)ishowever
fromraising
socialscientists
naterecurrent
theme(see Mielants,
2000)whichprevents
politicaleconomiesin thelongrun.
questionsaboutthepathdependenceofdifferent
The Industrial
Revolution
onlyenabledtheWestto achieveeconomicgrowthmore
widenedthegapbetweenthecoreandthe
andmoreintensely
(whichultimately
rapidly
evenmore)afterc. 1800AD(see the debatebetweenWallerstein,
Hicks,
periphery
Furtado,and othersin Guarducci[1983:695-746]andessaysin Prak,[2001]).Moseley
"therehadalreadybeena radical
reminds
us thatevenbeforetheIndustrial
Revolution
shiftin theglobalbalanceof powerin favorof Europe,particularly
byvirtueof its
controloftheseawaysofworldtrade"(1992:538).
2On theuse of
cf.Mahoney(2000).
sociology
pathdependencein historical
3 In theinternal
Chinesemarketmanybulkcommodities
(e.g.,rice,tea,and salt)
relatedto a
wereexchangedoverlongdistances(Golas,1980:299),whichis probably
and
market
in
stimulated
turn
innovations
that
seriesofimpressive
activity
technological
ruralproductivity
(Rawski,1972:96-98).Butin thisarticleI willfocuson theexchange
canbe madewithEurope,as tothe
betweenChinaandnon-China;
hencea comparison
werecrucialfor
markets
mannerwhereinthecaptureand dominanceofinternational
markets
or
that
local
not
I
do
theestablishment
of a capitalist
regional
imply
system.
merchant
ofa capitalist
werelesssignificant,
butwhenone dealswiththecreation
class,
one hasto focuson thehighest
levelsofprofit,
i.e.,longdistancetradenetworks
(Ptak,
1994:35).
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causesoftheeconomicboomcanbe tracedbackto thelateTang
(Balazs,1969:16),itwasundertheSungthatChinesegovdynasty
obtainedfromtaxesontrade,reachedanunpreernmental
revenue,
imcedentedpeak.4WhenduringtheSungmaritime
technology
(Shiba,1970:5-6) andtheChinesegovernment
provedevenfurther
embarkedupon massiveshipbuildingprograms
(Dawson,1972:
167),a "majorupsurgein trade"occurred(Hall,Kenneth,1985:
structure"
194),parallelwitha subsequent"changeofcommodity
and
Yuan
the"prothe
1991:
220-21).During Sung
dynasties,
(Xiyu,
and the
ductionof immediatematerialmeans of subsistence"
become
to
overseas
had
central
bulk
commodities
of
these
transport
silktrade(Ma,
trade(Kai, 1991:232).5Asidefromtheincreasing
themain
became
trade
of
the
massive
1999),
porcelainsprobably
1991:
in
the
loaded
221),
ships(Xiyu,
oceangoing
exportcommodity
foodstuffs
were
of
transported
largequantities perishable
although
overseasas well,forexampletoJapanandKorea(Shiba,1970:88).
inducedtoturntocommerUndertheSung,peoplewere"gradually
ortotaketononagricultural
(Shiba,
pursuits"
ciallyoriented
forming
tradepolicy
"anactiveforeign
1975:39),and-evenmoreimportantwithoverseascountries"
topromotetraderelations
wasformulated
a directresultof
therefore
flourished
was
That
trade
1971:
33).
(Ma,
1969a:
24). "The
policies(Filesi,1972:10;Lo,
Imperialgovernment
associations
thestateandthemerchant
between
during
relationship
thanat anyotherperiodin thehistory
theSungwasmoreintimate
ofChina"(Ma, 1971:90). Thiswasrelatedtothefactthatalthough
in anyformoftrade,
fromparticipating
"wereprohibited
officials
in
commercial
ventures
of
them
[as] they
many
privately
engaged
and
carried
on busifavorable
their
position
specially
exploited
revenues
nesses"(Ma,1971:129).6Bytheendofthetwelfth
century,
1In themid-twelfth
as muchas 20%ofthestate'scashincomewasderived
century,
on themaritime
trade"(Xiyu,1991:217).
"fromthetariff
r>
and
toXiyu,ittooklargeships40 daystosailfromCantontoSumatra,
According
60 daysfromthereto theArabianpeninsula(1991:220).
6Ma statesthatbecauseoftheir
officials
position,
governmental
andpaidno
corneredtheircommodities,
evadedtaxesinbusinesstransactions,
coston theirgoodsbyusinggovernment
boatsand freelabor.
transportation
fundsas private
capital(1971: 130).
Theyeveninvested
government
of[their]
estabitwas"commonpractice
toputtheownership
commercial
Forofficials,
orevenhisservants"
closerelatives
underthenamesoftheofficial's
lishments
(Ma,1971:
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fromindirect
taxeson tea,salt,andwinewasabout70%ofthetotal
wealthofChina
staterevenue(Deng,1999:316).Thus,theprincipal
undertheSung-morethanat theend of theMingor duringthe
(Gernet,1982:
Ch'ing-came fromcommerceand craftsmanship
derived
were
still
323).Whereasin theearlySungrevenues
mostly
"afterthemiddleoftheNorthern
ofagriculture,
fromthetaxation
ofitsrevenue
an
the
state
drew
proportion
increasing
Sungperiod,
cenfromtrade"(Shiba,1970:45). Thus,Chinawasbythetwelfth
its
of
coercion
not
a
on
the
extraeconomic
state
peastury
living
of
thegrowing
tosurvive
butrathera stateattempting
might
antry,
derivedfromtrade.The
revenues
nomadicincursions
byfostering
SouthernSungdependedevenmoreon trade(Deng,1999:314)
sincebecause of the threatof nomadicinvasionsit "constantly
turnedforhelp to big merchants"
(Balazs,1969: 19). These had
the
emergedin theSungperiodwhen expansionoftradeled toinoflabor,particudivisions
andgrowing
urbandevelopment
creasing
seemedto
which
and
salt
in
the
industries,
larly
porcelain,
mining,
as inEurope'stextile
ofcapitalism
features
havedevelopedidentical
a
much
on
and miningindustries,
largerscale (e.g.,Weiji,
only
in
activities
commercial
that
fact
the
This
is
confirmed
1992).7
by
occurred"on a farlargerscale
and Kwantung
Fukien,Chekiang,
thanthatoftheEuropeancountries"
(Gernet,1982:326).AccordinChinathan
thestandard
oflifemusthavebeenmuchhigher
ingly,
coninEuropeinthisperiod(Needham,1969:171),whichprobably
tinuedto be thecase fora verylongperiodof time,as Pomeranz
trade
pointsout(2000:94). Relatedtothisupsurgeininternational
fromthenomadswhichcreateda "Sung
threat
wastheevergrowing
134), since officialswere legallyforbiddento partakein anyformof business(Dawson,
1972: 176). DuringtheSung,not onlyofficialsbut also even "membersof thecourtheld
shares in shippingand manufacturing
companies"(Lo, 1969a: 24). In eleventhcentury
withthemerchants"despitethe
Quanzhou, forinstance,"local officialstradedprivately
factthatinternationaltradewas thenstillprohibitedin thatport (Clark, 1995: 58).
7This is
actuallynot surprising,
giventhefactthatin Sung China "wheatand barley
yield/seedratios were about 10:1, and a good deal betterforrice, [while]the typical
medievalEuropean yield/seedratioforwheatwas 4:1" (Maddison, 1998: 31). Chinese
(Maddison, 1998: 32), whilethe
self-sustaining"
agriculture,however,was "persistently
Europeans,in order to achievea divisionof labor in theircontinent,founditexpedient
to constructa peripherythrougha systematic
colonizationprocess,firstwithinEurope,
later abroad (Wallerstein,1974). Moreover,a structuralbullion drain to the East (see
below) resultedin a relativeshortageof capital,whichoftencaused highinterestrates,
in turnlimitingagriculturalyields(Clark, 1988).
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mercantile
policy[that]soughtbyallmeanstoincreasethenational
wealththrough
theexpansionoftrade"(Shiba,1983:110).In this
theChinesegovernment
becameverysuccessful:
tradewithSoutheastAsiaflourished
1966:
but
commercial
contacts
23),
(Willmott,
withotherpartsof theworldgrewmoreintenseas well,mostno1985:227),India(Dawson,
withthePhilippines
(Hall,Kenneth,
tably
Arabia
East
Africa
1972:174),
1970),
(Chou,1974:103),
(Chittick,
and evenEgypt(Scanlon,1970).The factthatChinesenavalpower
either:thiswasa
wasveryimpressive
(Lo, 1955)wasno coincidence
directresultofthenomadicincursions
(Dars,1992:10).Since112627 (theconquestof NorthChinaby theJurchen)the"lastgood
Asianpastures"
werecutofffromtheSungwhilethecaravanroutes
1985:
CentralAsiabecameclosedto them(Hall,Kenneth,
through
to
for
This
forced
the
Chinese
196).
government"compensate itsira powerful
reversible
ofhorsesbycreating
navy"(Smith,
shortage
threatofnomadicincurPaul,1991:306). It wasthusthegrowing
sionsthat
theSouthern
Sungtobuilda navyinordertoman
encouraged
all waterways
whichstoodbetweenthemand theirnorthern
This
andskills
producedtechniques
competitors. construction
totheeconomy
whichprovedbeneficial
(Hall,John,1985:46;
Dawson,1972:164).
initsexpanitwasbecauseChinawas"blocked
toGernet,
According
the
Chinese
turned
sionto thenorthand north-west,
world
[that]
shifted
towardsthe
to thesea and itscenterof gravity
resolutely
maritime
of
the
south-east"
(1982:328).
regions
threatofChinand MongolinvaThus,becauseof thegrowing
stimulate
tradefor
wasforcedto first,
sions,theSunggovernment
tobe abletocounterthemilitary
thesakeofincreasing
itsrevenues
force(in
expanditsnavyintoa formidable
danger,and secondly,
orderto counterthenomadicthreatsincethebuildup ofa large
wasno longeran option).Thisinturnhada positive
impact
cavalry
ofprotection
andinformatrade(due to thelowering
on maritime
tioncosts).
It is probablybecauseof stateintervention
(throughtheconofhugeships)thattheChineseshipshad becomemuch
struction
(Xiyu,1991:222).
largerthantheirEuropeanorArabcounterparts
of theSouthand the
At thesametime,thecombinedprospering
in theNorthlead to an enormousinfluxof minomadicwarfare
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grantsfromNorthto South(Shiba,1970: 181),whichin turnincreasedthedemandforallkindsofcommodities
(Lippit,1987:39),
and propelledtechnological
in thatarea (Jones,1988:
innovations
from
massmigrations
andunprecedented
77).Thus,theenormous
centuries
andthirteenth
northern
to southern
Chinain thetwelfth
can notbe separatedfromtheeconomic"boom"(agricultural
speand
industriurbanization
cialization,
commercialization,
increasing
alization)in theSouthafter1127(Dars,1992:35; Elvin,1973:113trade(Ebrey,1996:
79) and thesubsequentincreasein maritime
for
In
141-44).8 thirteenth-century
Fujian, instance,theregional
froma subsistence
economybasedon
economywas "transformed
thecultivation
ofriceand hempintoan export-oriented
economy
artisangoods,
producingluxuries[as wellas] a rangeof finished
and metal"(Clark,1995:70). The
stoneware,
porcelain,
including
to
thatricehad to be imported
become
so
commercialized
region
such as theJiangnan
Fujian"fromareas of surplusproduction,
and
of
River
the
(Clark,1995:
valley Guangdong"
provinces
Yangzi
investment
of
state
itwas "theSungcombination
70). Essentially,
and greatermarketfreedomthataccountedfor the releaseof
scale.
productive
(Jones,1988:78) on an unprecedented
energies"
madeduringtheSung,
merchants
Despitetheenormous
profits
infirmcontrolofcertainsectorsoftheecontheEmpireremained
omy,as statemonopolieswereimposedupon themostlucrative
andtea(Rossabi,1970:
commodities:
incense,
salt,alcoholicliquors,
wereconas
the
silk
industries
Profitable
140-41).
(such
industry)
different
trolledbythegovernment
(Shiba,1970:111),an entirely
The
Chinese
situation
inwestern
fromtheconditions
govEurope.
to touchthesetradesexernment
"didnotallowprivate
enterprise
anddistritransport
ceptinareaswhereitcouldnotitself
supervise
the
bution"(Gernet,1962:81). Nevertheless,
"despite competition
fromthestate,privatetraders
flourished
duringthe12thand 13th
8 Because of the massive
migrationfromnorthernto southernChina (related to
nomadic incursionsin the North),
the sudden increase of population in SouthernChina, where cultivablelands
werelimited,had forcedpeople livingin thesoutheastcoastalareas to participate
in marinetrade to earn theirliving(Hui, 1995: 31).
The populationgrowthin SouthChina has been estimatedat 4 millionhouseholdsin 750
ADand grewto 12 millionin 1290 ADwhilepopulationin northernChina fellfrom10.5
millionhouseholds in 1110 AD to below 1 millionin 1235 AD(Kracke,1955: 480).
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centuries"
becauseofthedecreaseof
1962:77).Inaddition,
(Gernet,
transaction
costs(due to governmental
buildingof canals,and
within
the
China
witnessed
theformation
ofa
realm),Sung
security
nationalmarket(Elvin,1996:25), whichwascapableof achieving
intensive
to
(Curtin,1984:110).Itis notan understatement
growth
labeltheeleventh
and twelfth
centuries
theera ofa Chinesecommercialrevolution
Reischauer
& Craig,1973:132;Elvin,
(Fairbank,
oflabor,regional
1978:79),whichwasbasedona division
specializathan
tion,and overseastrade-and whichwas moreimpressive
inwestern
1982:320;Fu& Li,
Europeatthattime(Gernet,
anything
becauseofitswealth,
1956:239). Indeed,theImperialstateitself,
as a driving
forcebehindmuchsocioeconomic
can be considered
builtroadsandcanals,printed
as
it
demand,
development triggered
a
control
and
currency
papermoney, implementedpolicyof"strict
as faras possibleanyflight
ofChinesecurrency
designedtoprevent
of
the
the
confines
Empire"(Filesi,1972: 9). The state
beyond
andproducer,
"turned
itself
intoa merchant
bycreating
workshops
civil
servants
and
run
and commercial
bysystematienterprises by
thestatemonopoliesin orderto provideforthe
callydeveloping
maintenance
ofitsarmies"(Gernet,1982:323).UnlikeEurope,the
the national(internal)
state
was capable of pacifying
Imperial
increase
of
Chineseironand steel
in
turn
made
the
which
market,
1984:110).Duringthe
1966;Curtin,
possible(Hartwell,
production
not
for
labeled
"China's
greatestage" (Fairbank,
Sungnothing
of ceramicsexperienced
an unprece1992:88)9-"theproduction
dentedexpansion"
studies
dem1982:
321); archeological
(Gernet,
onstrated
thatlargeamountsofChineseporcelain
wentalloverthe
IndianOcean,up tocoastalEastAfrica(Filesi,1972).
thebalanceoflongdistance
Moreimportantly,
tradewasunquesinChina'sfavor(Lo, 1958:154).Itsimports
were(withthe
tionably
of
raw
materials
textiles)
(horses,hides,gems,
mostly
exception
and
other
luxuries)(Deng,1997b:271) whileits
spices,medicines,
were(withtheexception
ofminerals)
manufactured
exports
mostly
9"Thebesteconomic
oftheSongas measuredbypercapitaproducperformance
tionwasprobably
notsurpassedin Chinabeforethetwentieth
(Feuerwerker,
century"
1992:765).Somescholars
assertthatthedegreeofeconomicexpansion
duringtheMing
revolution
undertheSung(e.g.,Zurndorfer,
1988:
dynasty
surpassedthecommercial
under
the
late
154;see Dixin& Chengming,
2000).Yet,thecommercial
expansion
Ming
isbeyondthetemporal
itis notnecessary
toelaborate
scopeofthisarticle.In addition,
on itin thecontextofthearguments
here.
presented
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andironand
silktextiles,
commodities
books,artobjects,
(porcelain,
& Craig,1973:136)butalso
Reischauer
steelproducts)(Fairbank,
tea,lead, tin,and otherpreciousmetals(Balazs,1972:63; Deng,
1997b:272-73). DuringtheSung,thebiggestChineseshipswere
550tons(Xiyu,1991:218),andundertheYuansomegrain
probably
carriers
wereas bigas 1350tons(Deng,1997b:263).Thisis clearly
muchlargerthanin medievalwesternEurope.10
By theearlyfifof
constructed
teenthcentury
theChinese
ships 2,000tons,much
largerthananyEuropeanones(Chang,1974:349).Thus,up to the
farahead of EuChinawas technologically
mid-fifteenth
century,
(Chang,1991b:21).11ThattheSung
rope's maritime
capabilities
reliedon overseastraderesultedin theincreaseof
government
onward(Ma,
fromthetwelfth
ofmerchants
status
societal
century
"cul1971:125).Clarkevengoesas faras tospeakofan exceptional
merand
merchants
of
thegrowing
turaltransformation:
acceptance
Buta majorproblem
chantcareersamongelitesociety"
(1995:71).12
towardsa capitalistenvironment
whichimpededthe transition
10
Hanseatic cogs generallyhad a loading capacityof ISO tons,
Thirteenth-century
whichby 1400 had increasedup to 300 tons (Schildhauer,1985: 149).
11Schildhauerestimatesthat the entireHanseatic
League could musterc. 1,000
whichrepresenteda freight
vesselsin themid-fifteenth
capacityofc. 60,000 tons
century,
in termsof navalpower,
I
to
refer
When
(1985: 150).
Europe's technologicalinferiority
could not constructhuge ships: 1000 ton
thisdoes not implythatEuropean city-states
nefswereused byVenice in theEasternMediterraneanin thebeginningofthethirteenth
of warshipsthat China could
century(Hocquet, 1995: 549). But it was the multitude
constructwhichwas so impressive(Gernet,1962: 72). Indeed, in 1257 the Sung mobilized in onlythreeprefectures20,000 shipsforwarfareagainstthe Mongols (Lo, 1970:
171). In addition, some individualChinese merchantsmust have been enormously
wealthysincethewealthiesttraderscould own 80 or moresea-goingvessels(Shiba, 1970:
188; Deng, 1997b: 278), somethingunprecedentedfor thirteenth-century
Europe. I
thereforethinkit is erroneous and Eurocentricto claim thatprivatebusinessmenin
China were not capable of "accumulatingcapitalon as large a scale as European entrepreneursmanaged to do in earlymoderntimes"(McNeill,1992: 119).
12Beforetheeleventhand twelfth
merchantshad been excludedfrom
centuries*
elite circles;orthodox Confucianismhad designatedthemthe least prestigious membersof society.In a societyexperiencingsoaringprosperityso clearly
derivedfromcommerce,however,suchstigmaswereno longerviableand were
increasingly
ignored(Clark, 1995: 71).
Clark's assessmentsare certainlycorrect,but mostlikelyreferto the coastal provinces
around Fukienand Kwantung,not thewhole of China (Ptak,1994: 42) since merchants
continuedto be "legallyrankedat thebottomofsociety"(Chang, 1994: 65; Kracke,1955:
was thatundertheSung thestatewas so desperateforrevenue
485). Whatwas exceptional
based on trade that"honoraryrankswere awarded to merchantswho were especially
successfulin promotingforeigntrade and inducingforeignmerchantsto bringtheir
wares to China" (Dawson, 1972: 166).
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whichwasclearly
undertheSouthern
occurring
Sung(Ma,1971:86;
1954:
was
the
fact
thatimpressive
socioeconomic
devel141),
Kirby,
in
did
not
result
the
and
of
opments
political military
growing
might
theChineseinsideEurasia.
CHINAAND THE MONGOLS
Theseimpressive
ofsocioeconomic
didnotprepatterns
growth
venttheMongolconquestof Chinain thelatethirteenth
century
aboutwasenormous,
thisbrought
es(Davis,1996).Thedestruction
China(Roberts,1996:171)and centralChina
peciallyin northern
butalso in Persia(theKhwarazm
1992:
670-72),
(Smith,
Empire)
thatas manyas "35million
1993:
53-57).Jonesestimates
(Marshall,
ofthepopulation
ChinesewerekilledbytheMongols[or]one-third
in
toll
inthethirteenth
.
.
.
the
China
aloneatthetime
death
century
of theMongolconquestwasso largethatitmusthaveobliterated
The Mongolinvaeconomiclifeoverwideareas"(1988: 109-10).13
to as a "crisisofcapitalsionofSungChinahasalsobeenreferred
ism"(Jones,1988:110;Kirby,
1954:153).AlanK. Smithgoesas far
oftheSungdynasty
toclaimthat"after
theoverthrow
bytheinvadto
in
.
.
.
the
was
a
country subjected devastating
ingMongols 1276,
rule
China
never
ofitspast"
[and]
regainedthedynamism
foreign
the
Buell
considered
invasions
as nothing
(1991: 27-28).
Mongol
morethan"anunparalleled
disaster
forthesedentary
statesandempiressurrounding
Mongolia"(1992:2). Thus,itis quitecommonto
lateron (Jones,
blametheMongolsforeconomicfailures
1988:113)
musthavebeen devastating,
while,thoughtheinitialonslaughts
theseshouldnotbe exaggerated
(e.g.,Huang,1989: 147). In any
the
of
case, Mongolconquest SungChinacannotbe thesolereason
didnotoccur,butonehastotakeit
tocapitalism
whythetransition
intoaccountas an important
variable(Hartwell,
1962:162;Gernet,
& Hall,1997:47).
1962:18;Chase-Dunn

13
AlthoughJones's (1988) estimateis quite extreme,thereis a consensusthat"the
campaignsof ChinggisKhan and his successorsdown to the 1250's were murderousto
a degree recenthistorycan scarcelyequal" (Dreyer,1982: 14). Evento thirteenth-century
contemporaries"theextentand frequencyofmassacrescommittedbytheMongolswere
profoundlyshocking"(Phillips,1998: 67).
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One ofthekeyquestions
from
istherefore:
whoreally
benefitted
thePax Mongolicain thelongrun?The Mongolrulersthemselves
benefitted
fromtheirmilitary
certainly
conquestsin theshortrun.
costsdecrease
Needlesstosay,manymerchants
sawtheirprotection
once theMongolsestablished
theirrule(Rossabi,1990:356). But
weretheEuropeansin generalnotmost"blessed"ofallin thelong
techsuchas navigation
run?14
amountsof knowledge,
Increasing
werepassedon toEurope(Needham,1995;
niquesandgunpowder,
costsfor
ofprotection
Chou,1974:115),anda subsequent
lowering
was
their
for
on
the
which
survival,
commerce,
city-states
depended
in
theEuropeansbenefitted
obtained.Evenin termsofgeopolitics
in
enemies
of
their
Muslim
theformofan indirect
Egypt.
weakening
AlliancesbetweentheMongolsand Westernpowersagainstthe
Mamluks
nevermaterialized
(Boyle,1977:xiii),buttheMongolwars
the
Mamluks
1999)certainly
(Amitai-Preiss,
delayedthefall
against
Theonly
Mediterranean.
intheEastern
ofseveralCrusaderoutposts
terwhose
the
Russians
were
who
suffer
did
substantially
Europeans
under
were
ritories
wereravagedandwhoseprincipalities brought
tutelage.15
ina rareperiodof
whichresulted
BecauseofthePaxMongolica,
politicalunityin CentralAsia (Adshead,1993: 78), an "uninter(Ray,1991:83) butalso envoys,
ruptedflowof Europeantraders"
intoEastAsia(Needham,
and
ventured
artisans, missionaries,
safely
1954:188;Rossabi,1997:81).Yetduringthesameperiodthemain
towards
directed
bruntoftheMongolcampaigns
Burma,Vietnam,
Japan,Java,and CentralAsia (Dars,1992:328-43),fellupon the
Chinesepopulation(Dreyer,1982:14). In thepartoftheEurasian
14In the shortrun
mostlyTurkishMuslimand Uighurmerchantsprofitedas they,
in theMongolianEmpire(Endicottmorethananyothergroup,wereused as tax-farmers
West, 1989: 146; Allsen,1989: 116). But some westernEuropean merchantsalso benefittedin obtainingofficesunder the Mongols (Richard,1976: xxx) whileotherspenetrateddeep into Asia and made significantprofits(Lopez, 1975: 83-186). Indirectly,
Westernmerchantsbenefitedtremendouslyfromthe Pax Mongolica "qui avaitcréé les
circonstancespolitiquesfavorablesà l'expansionéconomique des Occidentaux"(Nystazopoulou, 1973: 570; see Balard, 1992: 29).
5 The traditional
explanationof the Mongols' sudden withdrawalfromEurope in
1241-42 aftertheirsuccessfulengagementsagainstEuropean armies in Liegnitzand
Sajo, is attributedto thedeath of theGrand Khan (Fletcher,1986: 47). Yet logisticaland
geographical problems that plagued the Mongol armies in theirfailed attemptsto
conquer Syria(Smith,1998: 61-62) may also have been a variableto explain whythe
Mongols did not renewany major offensivesin Europe (Sinor, 1972; Sinor, 1999: 20;
Morgan, 1986: 141).
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landmasscontrolled
of"postal
bytheMongols,elaboratenetworks
stations"
were
installed
which
insured
communication
relay
rapid
between
variouspartsoftheMongolian
Thesestations
must
Empire.
havereducedcostsof manyforeignmerchants
as theyprovided
andlodgingfacilities
(Rossabi,1990:354),butultisafety,
supplies,
the
"maintenance
of
the
stations
wasa heavyburdenon the
mately
1983:
in northern
264), specifically
sedentary
populace"(Allsen,
China(Schurmann,
itwas"western
1967:72).Moreover,
merchants"
whoused thehorsesof theofficial
mailto further
theirowncommercialinterest,
to do
despitethefactthattheywereunauthorized
so (Lopez, 1943: 172-73).16The increasedexploitation
of the
Chinesepeasantry
undertheYuancoincidedwitha majorincrease
of commerceacrosstheEurasianlandmassand a continuation
of
commerce
with
southeast
Asia
This
is
no
(Ptak,1998).
large-scale
leviesexactedfromthesedentary
coincidence:
theincreased
populathem
a
tionbytheMongoloverlords
sizable
"gave
surplusto exneeded.
This
in
turn
for
which
stimulated
they
change products,
crafts
andmanufacturing"
1967:5). Butofcoursethis
(Schurmann,
stimulated
bygreater
upturn,
expensesofthenobility,
byan
though
initialgrowth
ofcommerce
duetotheincreasing
economies
ofscale,
and bya decreaseof protection
costsand the"introduction
of a
nationwide
of
which
system papercurrency
replacedthelocalcurrencieswhichhadbeenin circulation"
1967:8) could
(Schurmann,
notlast.The intensified
of
the
exploitation
peasantry
augmented
"thesurplusavailablefortheMongolsandthusreinforced
thebasis
forthegreatexpansionof commerce.
sincein thelong
However,
runneitheragricultural
or productivity
the
increased,
production
materialbasis forcontinuedcommercial
expansionwas lacking"
For
China
the
1967:
(Schurmann,
8).
Mongolheritagewas quite
negativein thelongrun(Dawson,1972:209; Dars,1992:46-48)
sinceitwas"notonlya handicaptothefurther
ofthecoungrowth
but
also
the
cause
of
its
1979:
(Rodzinski,
try's
economy,
regression"
thefactthatmostofthetradewasin thehandsof
184).Especially
(Rodzinski,1979: 185) and thatmostprofits
foreignmerchants
derivedfromtradeweretakenoutof China(Dars,1992:49),was
Thus,onceagain,forwestern
quiteharmful.
Europethe"pacifica16In
addition,foreignmerchantscould easilymake up chargesof theftor robbery,
thereby"defraudingthelocal population[since]byMongolianlaw thelocals weremade
collectivelyresponsibleforall goods lostby travelingmerchants"(Allsen,1989: 99).
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because
butbenefits:
tion"oftheEurasianlandmass
nothing
implied
of increasing
contactwiththeEast,itwouldcometo knowabout
Easternnauticaltechnology17
gunpowder
(e.g.,compasses),
superior
more
and
much
1974:
(Need115),
(Chou,
(Ling,1947),printing
1981:
1969:
213; Kuhn,
ham,
52).
In thelongrun,theMongols
justsqueezedtoomuchoutoftheir
WhentheMongol
rose
until
theyfinally up in rebellion.18
subjects
drivenout ofChinaby1368,aftersevenwasfinally
Yuan dynasty
teenyearsofbloodywarsanduprisings
(Mote,1988),thevictorious
its power.The
with
was
maintaining
MingDynasty preoccupied
wasaliveandwellunderTamerlane
up tohisdeathin
Mongolthreat
andwiththeOyirat
theearlyfifteenth
Mongols.Hence,the
century,
focusedoncemore
to
be
had
oftheChineseEmperor
maininterest
and
nomadicinvasions,
oftheMiddleKingdom
on thesafety
against
sincemanypeasantshadsufofthecountryside
on thestabilization
theuprisings
feredtremendously
againstMongolrule(Mote,
during
thusno longerlookedupon naval
1977: 197). The Mingdynasty
theGreatWallhad beadequatelydefending
poweras necessary;
once more(Mote,1999:610-11).It is therefore
comeimportant
thatwasbehind
theearlyMingdynasty
ironicthatitwas precisely
that
of ZhengHe
the famousmaritime
caughtthe
expeditions
ithas
ofso manyscholars(e.g.,Ptak,1996).Nevertheless,
attention
oceanand
seaChinese
the
of
climax
"the
that
to be emphasized
occurredin Sung-Yuan
times,notin Ming"(Deng,
goingactivities
1997a:57).19The natureandgoalsoftheshort-lived
by
expeditions
oftheresurgent
thecontext
within
ZhengHe havetobe interpreted
ChineseEmpire.

17This is demonstrated the factthatin the
centurya flotillaof
earlyfifteenth
by
Zheng He was capable of making "a direct crossingfromSumatra to Mogadishu, a
straightrun of 3,700 miles"(Morton,1995: 128).
18Di Cosmo claimsthatthe
Mongol government"was plagued bytheproliferation
wastefuladministration... the Mongols' attitudeto governance
of an extraordinarily
remainederraticand negligent"(1999: 34).
19 "The
Ming court had no sustained interestin seafaring,no grasp of the
of
possibilities sea power.The Mingvoyageswerenot followedup but remainedisolated
toursde force"(Fairbank,Reischauer& Craig, 1973: 199).
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MINGCHINAAND EUROPE:DIVERGENTPATHS
voyagesby ZhengHe in theearlyfifAlthoughthemaritime
teenthcentury
hadan economiccomponent
1981),itwas
(Ju-kang,
intradeitself,
ormonopolistic
notso muchtheinterest
(privrights
these
but
rather
in
that
dominated
the
market
voyages,
place
ileges)
which
wasimportant
thepolitical
(international
prestige)
component
(Wang,1970b:375-401;Morton,1995:128),in orderto makethe
oftheMiddleKingdom,
fitin
on thefringe
"barbaric"
people,living
1989:343).20Indeed,
thetributary
tradesystem
(Abu-Lughod,
sellingdesiredproductssuchas silk,porcelainand lacquerwaretobarbaric
peopleswasviewedbytheChineseas a maniofcultural
festdemonstration
[as]Chineseculture
superiority
while
itself
wasChina'sgreatest
commodity, valuedwareswere
1991:6).
excellence
that
culture's
to
(Finlay,
testimony
the
and cultural
Thus,thenotionsofdiplomatic
through
prestigetoZheng
ofChinesewealthandpower-werecentral
demonstration
sent
outby
so
for
the
Not
He's voyages
1972:
230).21
(Dawson,
ships
whichfromthelateMiddleAgesonthepunyEuropeancity-states,
a foreign
and
ward,systematically
policyof
designed implemented
in
commercial
and
directconquest,politicalcontrol,
exploitation
20It is estimatedthaton
ZhengHe's voyagesan averageof 27,000 men traveledwith
him on 60 large vessels (Chou, 1974: 127). This exceeded by far"anythingEuropeans
wereable to dispatchto thesame watersin thenextcentury"(McNeill,1998: 229). Their
terminationwas veryimportantsincethesuccessof thePortuguese,and latertheDutch,
in capturingvitalemporiaeand crucialstrategiclocationsthroughouttheIndian Ocean,
was onlyfeasiblebecause thehuge Chinese vesselsno longerpatrolledthe seas. In that
sense, "China's abdicationwas Europe's gain" (McNeill, 1992: 113). When the Chinese
naval power withdrew,the Portuguesehad a "clear technologicalsuperiorityover all
Asian competitors"(Ptak, 1999: VII, 105). The maritimesuperiorityof the European
powers,combined withtheirskillfulexploitationof internalstrifeamong South Asian
powers (Scammell, 1995: XI, 8), enabled the formerto reap enormous profitsin East
Asia. Ironically,as Toussaintremindsus, "itwas theEuropean navigatorsfromtheother
side of Africa,guided by the compass knownto the Chinese,and equipped witharms
inventedbytheChinese"who wereto establishtheircolonialthalassocraciesthroughout
the Indian Ocean (1966: 79).
21
EspeciallyEmperor Yung-lo,an earlyMing usurper,feltthe need to publicly
had obtainedtheMandateofHeaven,and thetributes
demonstratethatthenewdynasty
obtained fromdistantcountrieswere centralin thisrespect(Chou, 1974: 128; Roberts,
1996: 185) whichexplainswhy"afterhis death themotivationof seekingrecognitionno
longer applied" (Roberts, 1996: 185-86). Moreover, the low returnof Zheng He's
voyageseventuallyled to the abandonmentof the project(Deng, 1997b: 256).
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order to ceaselesslyaccumulatecapitalfromtheirperipheries
2000:254-55).The Chinese,however,
(Mielants,
in termsofritualsubmission,
ceremonial
barterand
thought
of
inthecontext
formal
forcenturies
as developed
recognition
of
a
host
to
a superior,
civilization
condescending
powerful
andrelatively
distant,
(Finlay,
undeveloped
principalities
petty
1991:7).
The Europeansofcoursealso had notionsofreligious
superiority
butin theEuropeaninvis-à-vis
the "infidels"
theyencountered,
traderoutes
ofthelong-distance
itself
a product
tercity-state
systemofeconomicexin thecontext
totheEast-territoriality
wasframed
thatthe"the
striking
ploitation
(e.g.,Balard,1989).It is therefore
toconquerorsea lanes
werenotseekingterritory
Mingexpeditions
to monopolize"(Finlay,1991:8) althoughtheycouldhaveeasily
withtheEudone so (Mote,1999:616). Thiswasin starkcontrast
warswith
the
Hanseatic
where
cityleaguefought
ropeanexperience
in the
itstrademonopoly
theDutchbecauseitwantedto preserve
wascentral,
rentforitsmerchants"
Baltic.The"pursuit
ofmonopoly
1994:123).Thesamewastrue
ifnotalmostitsraisond'être(Spruyt,
in theMediterranean,
wherecity-states
bloodywarsforthe
fought
of
and themaintenance
of traderoutes,markets,
monopolization
"their"
colonies(e.g.,Balard,1983;Budak,1997:166).22
The deathofa dogein Venicewouldnothavebeenable to reofequallystrong
versethiseconomicpolicy,
citygiventhesituation
toEasternmarkets.
statescompeting
fortheaccesstotheirlifelines
thenavalexpediYet,thedeathofEmperorYung-lowhoinitiated
to cease further
tionsenabledtheConfucianbureaucrats
expediin 1433,took
tions(Wang,1970a:376).Onlyone moreexpedition,
place,butwhenin 1435a childbecameEmperor,

22It is truethat
competitionamong merchantsinvolves"a need to eliminateothers,
to wintherace forfavorableproductionfactors-cheaplabor,includingwomen,children
and slaves-and to increaseproductivity
byenforcinglongerworkinghoursand stricter
supervision"(Sprengard,1994: 17). But theusage of statelegislationand stateviolence
to guaranteeand safeguardmonopolies is one of themostprofitablepractices,whichis
mostoftenoverlooked(Baratier,1970: 338-39). Not surprisingly,
Europeansweremost
successfulin Asia when theywere able to establishmonopolies(Wong, 1999: 228), and
to achieve thisgovernmentalsupportwas crucial.
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the Confucianbureaucracy
came to dominatepolicyeven
the
wereallowedtodeteriorate
and the
more, Treasure-ships
starved
of
labor
.
.
.
within
a
were
the
shipyards
generation,
Chineselosttheknowledge
of howto buildTreasure-ships,
and privateChinesevesselsceased venturing
beyondthe
straits
ofMelaka(Finlay,
1991:12).2S
In theChineseEmpire,merchants
werenotconsidered
important
powerofthestate,according
enoughtobe backedupbythemilitary
toFairbank
(1965:51),becausetheChinesestateanditsbureaucrats
the
sectorat theexpenseofthesystematic
developupheld agrarian
mentand supportofthemerchants
(see alsoWong,2001:28). The
As Needhampointedout:
lattermayevenbe an understatement.
orderofsociety
couldneverarise
A pre-dominantly
mercantile
in Chinesecivilization
becausethebasicconceptionof the
of wealthy
mandarinate
was opposed to the value-systems
there
accumulation
could
indeed
merchants.
be, but
Capital
industrial
the applicationof it in permanently
productive
inhibited
the
scholar-bureauwas
by
enterprises constantly
their
crats,as anyothersocialactionwhichmightthreaten
in
China
achieved
merchant
never
Thus,
supremacy.
guilds
thestatus
andpowerofmerchant
guilds
anything
approaching
ofthecity-states
ofEuropeancivilization
(1969:197;cf.Southall,1998:149).24
themilitary
Essentially,
policyoftheMingshouldbe seen as a
clearbreakwiththatoftheSouthern
Sungand theMongolYuan,
maritime
trade(Deng, 1997a;Hui,
whichbothactively
promoted
forits
1995:31-32;Ptak,1993:8)-theSungoutofsheernecessity
overseas
theYuan fortheirmilitary
expeditions
politicalsurvival,
the
mid-fifteenth
"the
and
Indeed,
by
century
againstJapan Java.25
landlord-bureaucrat
factionat theMingcourtwasable to havethe
23This had
profoundconsequencesin termsoftheexistingbalance ofpower:bythe
earlyseventeenthcenturyChinesejunkswereno longera matchforDutchvessels,which
contemporaryChinese considered"huge" fortheirstandards(Chin-keong,1997: 249).
24The societal
prestigeofmerchantscan be illustrated
bythefactthatfromtheSung
dynastyon merchantswere "still prohibitedfrom takingthe civil service examinations"(Ma,1971: 125). This prohibitioncontinueduntilthe Ming(Elman, 1991: 12).
25The scale of thesenaval
expeditionsis enormous:accordingto Xiyu,4,400 ships
with140,000 soldiersinvadedJapan in 1281 (1991: 226).
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curtailed"
discontinued
andthemaritime
severely
activity
operations
thus
were
He's
maritime
1992:
4). Zheng
(Findlay,
expeditions
China
in thesensethat,havingexpelledtheMongols,
exceptional
itsbattered
wantedtoreassert
itself
prestige
byuplifting
symbolically
1991:
the
entire
226).26When thiswas
region(Xiyu,
through
thatis,from
thematter,
therewaslittlesenseinpursuing
achieved,
oftheelitethatwasin charge(Wang,1970a:224theperspective
notesSnooks,"farexceededthe
25). "Thecostsofthisexpansion,"
toan end[as]Chinabecame
itwasbrought
andtherefore
benefits,
techbackward
and
isolationist, relatively
introspective,
increasingly
the
overstatement:
(1996: 318). The lastis a definite
nologically"
when
ChineseEmpirewasa formidable
power,certainly compared
in Europe.Not thatit
nation-states
to someoftheweakemerging
itwanted-the
was able to conqueranything
bloodybattleswhich
indicate
fifteenth
the
in
Vietnam
werevainly
century
during
fought
thelimitsofitsstrength
(Lo, 1969b:60). Butthemainpointis that
the elite in charge,and especiallythe Confucianbureaucracy,
(Mote,1999: 615). Even
strongly
opposedforeigninterventions
KwanChina(mainly
fromsouthern
whenmassivechain-migration
offer
not
did
the
Chinese
and
government
tung Fukien)continued,
exist
there
did
nor
orprotection,
Chinese"anybacking
the"overseas
a politicaldesireto assisttheabandonedsubjectsof theCelestial
(Sun, 2001: 72; see also Hudson,1964: 354). Quite the
Dynasty
to "reducethesizeofthe
after1371theMingattempted
contrary:
communities
overseas
Chinese
[as it]brandedprivatesea
growing
"
1995:
'thieves' (Hui,
merchants
'bandits,'
35) or "pirates"
(Chang,
1991b:26).27All Chinesewhowantedto buildshipsand venture
overseasin pursuitof tradewereoutlawed(Mote,1999:720). By
tribute
aJavanese
Chinesecourteven"requested
1410,theImperial
backto China"(Chang,
missionto helpsendChineseimmigrants
for
1991b:17). In contrast,
protection
Europeanpowersoffered

26Rossabi
goes as farto label ZhengHe's voyagesan "aberration"ofChinesehistory
(1997: 79). Mote calls them"thegreatanomaly"(1999: 616).
27The
illegalChinese maritimediaspora and the extensivetradingnetworkwhich
reliedon itindicatesthatChinese merchantswereverymuchpreparedto takerisksand
challenge governmentalauthority(Ptak, 1994: 36-37). It is thus unfairto state that
Chinese commercialclasses"remainedso thoroughly
subjectto an imperialbureaucracy
as to inhibitlarge-scaleindependententerpriseon theirpart"(McNeill, 1992: 113).
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theirnationals,
wherever
theytraded,and oftenusedtheirdistress
formilitary
intervention
on theirbehalf.28
as a pretext
The logicalquestionis whatChinacouldgainfroma policyof
tribes
andkingdoms,
allsecondary
tonearby
expansion
surrounding
in wealthand technological
polprowess.The Ming'sisolationist
meroverseas
trade
for
edict
banned
1371
an
private
Imperial
icy-in
withthe
toprevious
a return
chants-was
preoccupations
essentially
as it reinforced
nomadicthreats.The earlyMingdynasty,
royal
controlin therealm(Dardess,1973: 169),expellednot onlythe
as well(Phillips,1998:112).ForMongolsbutall otherforeigners
to travelthrough
continue
of
traders
China,butit
course,
did,
eign
reflected
a different
the
Chinese
note
that
to
is important
Empire
in itscountry
merchants
towards
attitude
duringtheSung
foreign
on theone handand thesubsequent
and Yuan dynasty
Mingand
1943:
on theother(Lopez,
181).
Ch'ingdynasties
interms
ofChina'ssocioeconomic
factor
Butthemostimportant
is,in myopinion,thelackofadequately
backingup
development
ofstatesupportduringboth
withvariousforms
Chinesemerchants
to
the Ming and Ch'ingdynastieswhen it was not permitted
the
abroad
for
trade
abroad
totravel
"Chinesemerchants
[because]
or
normative
not
define
could
expectedbehaviorpatgovernment
were
Bans
1968:
terns"
81).
(Mancall,
ships
imposedagainst
building
and "a lot of merchant
by theauthorities"
shipsweredestroyed
a statemonopoly
(Xiyu,1991:226) sincetheearlyMing"advocated
trade"
tradeinsteadofprivate
on foreign
(Xiyu,1991:226).
foreign
tradethushadtoresorttoillegalsmuggling
maritime
Whileprivate
"cutdownon theconactivities
(Chang,1991a),theMingemperors
of
and armaments.
ofwarships
struction
Alongwiththereduction
were
theprovincial
fleets,
warships
replacedby
gradually
large-size
inconstruction"
whichwereinferior
smallflat-bottom
(Xiyu,
barges,
28These
as theywere used by European mercantilestates
practicesof territoriality
also find theirorigin in the intercitystate systemof the late Middle Ages, with the
The city-statehad extrafouraineor buitenpoorterij.
phenomenon of the bourgeoisie
territorial
powersbeyonditsproperwallsin thesense thatitscitizenswhowerelivingfar
away in the countrysidecould only be triedby urban magistrates.From the twelfth
in thecountrysidepurchasedcity-state
centuryon, thewell-to-do
citizenshipeven ifthey
neverlived there,preciselyforall kindsofjuridical and economic benefits.During the
peak of the intercitystate systemin Europe (1250-400), many cities consistently
prerogativesas instrumentsof their imperialist
implemented these extraterritorial
strategies(Uytven,1982: 250-52; see also Fedalto, 1997).
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1991:227).Although
in 1567theMinggovernment
begantolegalize
someChinesecivilianundertakings
overseas(Chang,1991a:246),
formostof the Mingdynasty,
foreigntraderemainedoutlawed
oflaws
controls
1969:
1987:
99;
39) andgovernment
(Huang,
Lippit,
allalong
enforced
on maritime
tradeappearedtohavebeenstrictly
thecoastalareas(Ptak,1999:III, 33; Demel,1994:98; Chin-keong,
1997:224). Of course,becauseofChina'simmensecoastallittoral
and the factthatan all-controlling,
smoothly
operatingoriental
did not exist,the ban on seabornetrade
despoticgovernment
trade
andtherefore
to
be
unenforceable,
illegalmaritime
appeared
continued
on a largescale(Deng,1997b:270).Themainconclusion
is notthatChinawascutofffromtheworldas ifitloweredan iron
curtainover itselfor thatactualtradediminished
dramatically
butthattheexclusion
betweenChinaandherneighbors,
policies:
• deprived
have
whichmight
ofmuchrevenue
thegovernment
1969:
andexports
beenobtainedfromimports
99);
(Huang,
• seriously
in a
theeconomyofthecoastalprovinces
affected
1982:
232);29
way(Ts'ao,
negative
• madeitdifficult
andseamentoreturn
forChinesemerchants
homeforfearofpunishment
(Reid,1999:63);
• limitedtheoverallmagnitude
trade(Sun,2000:
ofmaritime
137);andmoreimportantly
• deprivedtheChinesemerchants
ofvitalgovernmental
sup1998:
229).
port(McNeill,
Thisis probably
relatedtothefactthat,despitethegrowing
priwerefromthemid-fifteenth
vate,illegaltrade,Chinesemerchants
backon largely
confined
to tradein theirowngeopolitical
century
further
venture
much
beyond
yard,SoutheastAsia,and ceasedto
thewestofMalacca(Ptak,1999:V, 148).Fromnowon,theircomsmallareaoftheglobe
mercialactivities
toa relatively
wereconfined
withthepreviousSung
(Hall, 1985:197).Thisis in sharpcontrast
merchants.
andYuandynasties
their
thatactively
supported overseas
to
Bothdynasties
hadimplemented
oceangoing
"policies encourage
The
had
builtwareand
1991:
trade"
218).
shipping
(Xiyu,
Sung
29Withthe
implementationof the exclusionpoliciesunder the Ming,a majorport
as Ch'uanchou "fellon eviltimesfromwhichitneverfullyrecovered.Thoughsome trade
was stillcarriedon duringthe Ming and the Ch'ing, the cityas an internationalport
declined" (Ma, 1971: 46; Clark,1995: 73).
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housesformerchants
and lighthouses
on thecoast(Dawson,1972:
and
financial
andtechnical
various
kinds
of
166),
provided
support
assistance
with
these
toshipbuilders,
whoinreturn
pledgedmilitary
to
the
called
1969c:
when
68-91).Thus,
upon(Lo,
ships
government
wentsuccessfully
hand
commercial
expansionand stateprotection
a
inhand.In addition,
conducted
"theMongolian
nobility
policyof
1967:
aid
to
its
merchants"
'financial and protection'
(Schurmann,
cen6). Yet,afterthedefeatoftheMongolsin thelatefourteenth
did
not
need
the
merchants
court
the
Chinese
tury,
(Ming)Imperial
merchants
whohad beenusedby
theforeign
Moreover,
anymore.
a backlash
ofxenophotheMongolstocollecttaxeswerenowfacing
1996:175).
Reischauer
& Craig,1973:178;Roberts,
bia (Fairbank,
fromtheseas"wasimpossiblein
Once again,the"withdrawal
couldimposesucha measure
Europewhereno centralauthority
oforientaldespotism.
Thisis nota matter
Many
uponmerchants.
of "the
scholarshavestatedoverand overagaintheimportance
localeconomic
and competitive
autonomous
ofpartly
multiplicity
1992:4, Chirot,1985:
(Mann,1988:18; Findlay,
powernetworks"
and
in
order
to
1996:
183; Snooks,
318)
explainsocioeconomic
Suffice
it to saythat
in thelongrun.30
development
technological
not
a
sufficient
condition"
was
a
fragmentation necessary,
"political
to
occur.
Pearsonis
to
for
a
transition
(Hall, 1988:24)
capitalism
ada uniquely
efficient
that"theChinesestate,controlling
convinced
that
hinder
innovation
did
enforce
was
able
to
ministration,
policies
is
and economicchange"(1991:68). Up to thispointhisstatement
Thiscouldnotonlybe observedundertheMing,buteven
correct.
the
socioeconomic"miracle"underthe Sung dynasties
during
30For
Wong Europe (as a "conglomerationof smallunitswithsometimesoverlapping jurisdictions")and China (as a unifiedagrarianempire) are juxtaposed as two
extremeswithinEurasia (1997: 77). Holton for instance,notes that "capitalismof a
modern kind developed ratherin the relativelydecentralizedWest, where political
structures
werefarfrommonolithic,allowinginternaldifferentiation"
(1986: 134). More
socioeconomic
and
is
that
China's
(and cultural)
unprecedented
impressive
important
developmentduringtheSung,coincidedwiththeexceptionalexistenceof a multipolar
politicalsystem(Snooks, 1996: 318; Modelski& Thompson, 1996: 151; Rossabi, 1983).
Thus, it followsthat the commercialsuccesses of the Chinese Sung dynastywas an
an epiphenomenonoutsideChina's
exceptionalperiod,"an episode ofextraordinariness,
mainstream"(Deng, 1999: 322). The SouthernSungwas exceptionalin thesense thatthe
imperialgovernmenthad to take revenuesfrommaritimetrade seriously.In contrast,
"formost of imperialhistory,the state's principalsource of revenue was land taxes"
(Wong, 1997: 90).
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(Smith,1991:308-12).However,as theChineserecordindicates,
therewasnotonlyattimestoomuchstatepower-as oftenhasbeen
assertednationbuttoo little!Europeancity-states
and emerging
stateswerefullybackingup theirtraderswithas muchpoweras
wasa "commercial
possible.Venice,forexample,
republicthatsysto increasestateincome,
used statepower,notmerely
tematically
as a sociomerchants
butalsotoincreasetheincomeoftheVenetian
such
economicclass"(Curtin,
1984:116).Forideal-typical
city-states
as GenoaandVenice,"commerce
andcoercionwerecloselylinked,
if not inseparable"(Curtin,1984: 116). In generalthe peaceful
ofthe
natureofAsiantradein theIndianOceanpriortothearrival
to
the
in
contrast
stood
and
the
Dutch
aggressive
sharp
Portuguese
The
1984:128).31
policiesofthelatter(Lewis,1978:VII,264;Curtin,
itselfwas
ofgovernment
factthatin EastAsiathestatemachinery
merchants
notcontrolledor heavilyinfluenced(Wang,1990:
by
401-02; Pearson,1991:76) had far-reaching
consequencesin the
pregovernments
longrun.Whilein Europemerchant-controlled
imbasedon commercial
ofcapitalism
paredthewayfora system
31One should not idealize the nonviolentChinese maritimeventuresin theIndian
Ocean, since theyclearlydid have an intimidatory
componentto them(Wade, 1997:
154-56) and violencewas afterall occasionallyused byZhengHe's forces.But thisdoes
not imply that the Chinese in the Indian Ocean were operating identicallyto the
Europeans. Needham illustratesthiswell:
in dominatingno principality,in settingup no fortsor bases, in treating
peaceablybyand largewithall thepeoples amongwhomtheycame,theChinese
were clearlythe inheritorsof,and participatorsin, a millenarytradition,which
was brokenonlybytheirruptionof European capitalistimperialismin theAsian
seas (1970b: 214).
Because the revenuesof maritimelong distance trade were crucial to Europe's comand nation-states
(Thompson,1999:177),itwas self-evident
petingmercantilecity-states
and setup maritimetrading
thatonce theypenetratedAsianwatersthey"builtfortresses
to excludeunwantedcompetitors
networksto claimwholekingdoms,[whileattempting]
fromaccess to overseasresources"(Sprengard,1994: 8). Thus, thecolonizationpolicies
pursued by Europeans fromthe fourteenthcenturyin the Mediterraneanup to the
"scrambleforAfrica"in the late nineteenthcenturywere essentiallypart of the same
process,as internalEuropean competitionfueledthe ongoinggeographicalexpansion
of European monopolisticcontrolover scarce resourcesand keystrategiclocationsto
theseresources(cf. Sprengard,1994: 10). Essentially,
priorto the arrivalof Europeans
in the Indian Ocean in the sixteenthand seventeenthcenturies,theAsian seas could be
called a "mareliberum"(Ptak,1994: 36), and because of therelativelack of monopolies
based on violence, most commercialties "were built upon a mutuallybeneficialand
flexibleframeworkof 'tributeand trade' thatallowed participantsfromeitherside to
waysto suittheirown purpose"(Chininterpretthenatureof theirrelationsin different
keong, 1997: 212).
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thisdid not occurin China(Fairbank,
Reischauer&
perialism,32
theeconomicgrowth
and the
Craig,1973:195).On thecontrary,
monetarization
of theentireSoutheastAsianregion,fromSouth
divisionof
Chinato EastIndia,was embeddedin a interregional
morebygeographic
and ecological
laborwhichwas "determined
desiderata"
considerations
than by politicalor organizational
1990:86).NotbecauseEastAsianswerefundamentally
(Lieberman,
less proneto accumulate
wealth,farfromit,but,as Abu-Lughod
"unlike
their
[ChinesemerEuropeancounterparts,
pointedout,
(1989:340)
chants]couldnotuse thestatetoadvancetheirinterests"
a
the
and thusforcefully
exploitative
imposeupon
region highly
Thisisa veryimportant
statement,
yetshedoesnot
system.
capitalist
ofChineseideology
Wasita matter
elaborateon thiscrucialfactor.
I
In
think
thisisunlikely.33
or
1998:
155),culture, religion?
(Southall,
in
ordertoexplainwhytheChineseEmpirecouldgiveupitsinterest
and
much
abandon
it
trade
wanted
maritime
when
to, pretty
foreign
toEurope,wehavetocompare
instarkcontrast
Chinesemerchants,
in whichthe
Chinesecitieswiththe Europeancity-state
system,
wielded
of
power.
oligarchy merchant-entrepreneurs significant
more
and not
not
urbanized
was
the
fact
that
Europe
Despite
and
thanChinaandthat"theAsianeconomy
morecommercialized
on vastly
intra-Asian
tradecontinued
greaterscalesthanEuropean
in Asia"(Frank,1998: 184),thepolitical
tradeand itsincursions
vis-à-vis
the monarchwas
powerof the merchant-entrepreneur
different:
EdwardIII couldneverhavefinancedhis war
entirely
aidof
oftheconditional
financial
France
without
thesupport
against
norcouldCharlesV everhadbecomeEmperor
Italianbusinessmen;
withoutthe criticalsupportof Germanbankers.If international
bankerswerevitalto anyimportant
military
campaigna European
fromtheMiddleAges to thesixmonarchwantedto undertake,
1991:
teenth
on
McNeill,1992:119),evenmore
145;
century (Brady,
his
citizens
who
were
taxed.In mostplaces,this
were
important
32 In

seventeenth-century
England, for instance,"the central governmentcame
under thedominanceof themercantileeliteand itsassociatedgroupswho
increasingly
establisheda parliamentaryregime advancingtheirspecificinterests"(Baumgartner,
Buckley& Burns 1976: 59). See also Rodinson (1970: 32).
331
ofvirtually
agreewithElvinthat"theattribution
unchangingculturalcharacteristicsas thekeyto discriminating
betweenChina and Europe as regardspatternsof longtermeconomic growthmustbe ruled out" (1988: 103).
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taxingwas scrutinizedby local estates and assemblies34or cityclasswieldedsignifileaguesin whichthemerchant-entrepreneurial
cant political-and even militarypower.This was not the case in
but the merchant
China: peasant revoltscould overturna dynasty,
let
class could not challengethegentry's
authority, alone theImperial one. Why?Because in China,unlikeEurope,merchantscould
nichewhichsecuredlong-term
notcarveoutan institutional
political
of theirricheswhich
power.This was essentialforthepreservation
had been obtainedin theirquest for a ceaseless accumulationof
As
niche is preciselythe city-state.35
capital.A crucialinstitutional
Deng admits:
the merchantclass was activelyinvolvedin theestablishment
of European cities,while in China citieswere built by the
authorities[so] China did not have a historyof city-states
[whichwas] one of themain reasonsthatChina did not produce an independentbourgeoisieclass(1999: 199).
thatChinesecitieswere
Althoughone shouldabandontheideal-type
morepoliticalthancommercial,a largeChinesetowngenerally
who representedtheimperialgovwas dominatedbyofficials
were
asjudicialand fiscalmatters
insofar
ernment,
particularly
concernedand (unlikeour towns)it did notembodytheidea
of emancipationand ofliberty(Balazs, 1969: 16).
FromtheSungonwards,wealth,politicalpower,and socialstatusin
withthe gentry,
the Chinese Empirebecame virtually
synonymous
whereasin Europe themerchantclasswas able to forgea coalition
1984:
withthe monarchyagainstthe landlordclass (Feuerwerker,
301-16).
34Fossier

see
(1991: 335-36). For an overviewof "medieval constitutionalism,"
Marongiu(1968).
35
Everypowerfullandlordin Eurasiawas at some pointin debt to merchantsin his
realm.Even theMongol princes"incurredenormousdebtsto merchant-moneylenders"
(Endicott-West,1989: 128). But mypointis thatmerchants,withtheexceptionof those
in westernEurope, never had sufficient
political and militarypower to punish their
borrower in case he wanted to defaulton the repaymentof his debt or engage in
taxation"(McNeill,1992: 120) or "underhandexpropriation"
practicesof "confiscatory
(Epstein, 1997: 169). Thus, the urban-basedmerchantentrepreneurnot onlyheld the
European nobilityat itsfinancialmercy,but throughloans and payadvances"whichtied
workersto employersas much as peasants to landlordsby rigidbonds of povertyand
debt,"keptcontrolover theworkingpopulationin thecitiesas well (Jones,1997: 251).
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It mayverywellbe thecase thatin China"theadventofa city
createditsownculture"
(Shiba,1975:42), thaturbanbourgeoisie
"themajority
andartisans
constituted
oftheinhabbasedmerchants
itants"(Shiba,1970:127;Lippit,1987:36) and thatformsofurban
in theMingperiod(Zurndorfer,
cameintoexistence
1983:
identity
of
medieval
but
crucial
is
that
"unlike
the
308-09),
Europe,
guilds
in the
thehang[guilds]in Chinawereneververystrongpolitically
ofthestate"(Ma,1971:
underthecontrol
citiesandtheywerealways
"theChinesemerchant
83).Asa consequence,
guildsneverachieved
thestatusandpowerofthemerchant
guilds
approaching
anything
of Europeancivilization"
of thecity-states
(Needham,1969: 197).
spellsouttheconsequences:
Keyaoclearly
medievaltownexistedand actedas a
becausethe[western]
Theburgher,
itreareditscitizen.
entity,
independent
political
Chinese
townpeopledid
as a socialgroup,playedtherolethat
in Chinawereweak
and merchants
not . . . the craftsmen
and
on
the
strata,depended
byit
monarchy werecontrolled
(1992:66-67).
the
In otherwords,despiteChina'sadvanceon Europethroughout
autocratic
MiddleAges,inthelongruntheImperial"centralized
syinfluence
on historical
stemexerteda negative
(Gandevelopment"
Rechtssichmachtfrei,
Stadtluft
burgerliche
quan,1992:82).Thenotions
with
interlinked
which
were
or
Frètes
erheit,
intrinsically
Eigentum
andsubsequent
urbaninstitutions
Western
capitalist
development,
1956:516;Needham,
aliento China(Schurmann,
werecompletely
ofgigantic
1969:185).MedievalChinesetowns,
size,incomparison
to Europe,also dominatedtheircountryside
socioeconomically
theriseofa politically
(Ganquan,1992:81).Yet,theydidnotfoster
merchant-entrepreneurial
bourgeoisie(Wong,1999:
independent
221; Maddison,1998:22)36sincethey"wereagenciesof imperial
controlled
court"(Shih,
bytheimperial
powerandwereverytightly
2001: 32).37This lack of urban autonomywas to a certain

36As
Day puts it,"thespread of the marketeconomyshould not be confusedwith
the rise of capitalism,as the example of China- a countrywithan organized market
networkbut withouta capitalistbourgeoisie-testifies"
(1999: 113-14).
37 It is therefore
logical that urban identityand the importantlegal notion of
citizenshipwas much strongerin westernEurope (see Boone & Stabel,2000).
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extentalso apparentin CentralAsia withitsmajesticcitiessuch as
1998: 340).
Samarkandor Bukhara(Ashrafyan,
It is therefore
importantto emphasizewhethera merchantelite
controlof the (city)
was in fullpolitical,economical,and military
structural
of
state,38
strategiesof
important
capable implementing
and
thepolitical-military
inrespectively
conquestsand reinvestments
commercialrealm withoutworryingtoo much about "extraecoand
nomiccoercion"and theimpositionof variouskindsof tariffs
whichcould
taxesbyoverlords,emperors,or evena ruralaristocracy
were totallyabsent
limitits power. In China, however,city-states
(Needham,1969: 185).39
When the Ming finallyreconqueredChina fromthe Mongols,
China'sfocusshiftedagaintowardstheNorth,awayfromtheSouth
(and the maritimetrade that was associated with it). Afterall,
mostofitsexistence,theChineseEmpire-in contrastto
throughout
in Europe-drew most of its revenue
the various puny city-states
fromthe taxationof land, and its economy-again unlikethe citystatesin Europe-was "basicallyself-sufficient"
(Findlay,1992: 159).
The Chinese state thereforehad no intrinsicneed to supportits
and nation-states.40
merchantsas did Europeancity-states
381 tend to
agree withPearson who assertsthat"controllersof smallpoliticalunits
have to takemuchmore interest,forbetteror worse,in overseastradethando
typically
rulerswithlargepeasant populationsthatcan be taxedrelatively
easily"(1991: 69). This
is again exemplifiedby the comparisonbetweenChina and Europe: "in contrastto the
Chinese state's success with agriculturalrevenues,many European states could not
extractmuch revenuefromthe land" (Wong, 1997: 134).
39
K'aifeng, the NorthernSung capital, was an enormous city.But it was the
administrative
and politicalcenterof the Empire,and thussomewhatcomparablewith
The citizensof
Constantinoplein the same century.It was absolutelynot a city-state.
K'aifeng"had no independentcitygovernmentas theirorgan of expression,and their
guildsweresubjectto governmentsupervision"(Kracke,1975: 53). Thiswas also thecase
in othercities:
unlikethecraftsmen
in medievalcitiesin Europe,Chineseartisansneverformed
a viable economic force in the citybecause the most skillfulcraftsmenwere
forced to serve the governmentand its bureaucrats. . . virtuallyall lucrative
businesseshad alreadybeen monopolizedbythestate.Heavytaxationand other
extortivepracticesspared no one but the scholar-official,
resultingin extremely
scarcecapitalforpeople to investinindustrialor commercialventures(Ma, 1971:
137).
Accordingto Elvin"citiesplayeda limitedrole in pre-modernChinese politicalhistory
and theabsence
[due to] themaintenanceofa continuouscentralizedimperialauthority
of politicalfragmentation"
(1978: 85).
40Chinese coastal
regionswere alwaysaffectedby maritimetrade,but ifone looks
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Once theexternalnomadicdangershad somewhatsubsided,
merchants
losttherelative
theyhadenjoyedbeforethe
importance
cametopower(Schurmann,
1967:7). UndertheMing
Mingdynasty
trade
becamea "potential
and subsequent
Ch'ingdynasty,
foreign
the
size
of Chinaand the
order
threatto thepolitical
and,given
feltlittleneed to
extentof its domestictrade,[thegovernment]
unavailable
domestically"
(Lippit,1987: 43). The
acquirethings
Chineseimperialstate,whichcontinuedto control"large-scale
tradewhilethewar-driven
and muchforeign
finance,
production
and
thoseactivities
enabled
allowed,
required
Europeanstatesystem
to be controlledby privatepersons,thusproducingcapitalism"
in which"commercialization
essentially
broughtabouta situation
withoutcapitalism"occurred(Marks,1997: 12). Since Chinese
couldnot(unlikesomeoftheirEuropeancounterparts)
merchants
wasthe
controlthestatetouseitfortheirowngoals-sinceitrather
were
otherwayaround(Wong,1983:248-51)-Chinesemerchants
facedwithan Imperialstatewhichactedmoreoftenas an annoying
their
thanas a usefultooltofurther
in themarketplace
competitor
whenever
interests
1972:
owncommercial
Moreover,
236).41
(Dawson,
at China as a whole,itsforeigntrade(withtheexceptionof theSouthernSung period)
withreferenceto the nation's total economy which was
"stillweighed insignificantly
self-sufficient"
(Chang, 1974: 357).
basically
41 Lane
spelled out the consequences of this policy: "merchantswho gained
protectionrentsfrominternationaltrade and colonization,"had an advantage over
one of themain
others(1958: 418). In theentirehistoryof thecapitalistworld-economy,
concernsofmerchantsin theirquest to ceaselesslyaccumulatecapitalis how to construct
and
and maintaina systemwhichenables themto achieve"lowerprofitsforgovernments
higherprofitsfortradingenterprises"(Lane, 1958: 413). In otherwords,the"maximizationof corporatecapitaland theminimizationofcorporaterisksand costs"(Sprengard,
interlinkedwithhow merchantentrepreneurscan use (or
1994: 17), are intrinsically
shouldI sayabuse) thestateto theirown advantage.As long as thePax Mongolica(which
decreased protection,information,and transportationcosts) lasted, archivalsources
Africa
had littleinterestto circumnavigate
clearlyindicatethatmostEuropeanmerchants
to get access to the wealthof Asia (Richard, 1970: 363). Yet when the Pax Mongolica
brokedown as theIl-KhanidEmpiredisintegratedafterthemid 1330's (Kwanten,1979:
244-46), the Chagatay Khanate split apart in the 1340's (Forbes Manz, 1983), and
once
afterthe1330's,European merchants,
MongolcontroloverChinawasdeteriorating
marketshad recoveredaftertheinitialonslaughtof theblackplague,pursueda strategy
and nation-statesto gain access to (and eventually
to use theirrespectivecity-states
conquer) the East (Sprengard,1994: 14). In contrast,the Chinese stateunder the Ming
butactuallyeven increasedthem:since
not onlydid notdecrease costsforitsmerchants,
maritimetrade was illegal fromthe Ming dynastyonward (Wiethoff,1963), Chinese
traders"could hardlydo withouta minimumofbribery"(Ptak,1994: 41; McNeill,1982:
47). This is veryimportantsince in the Early Modern Period "the most significant
and protectioncosts"(Allsen,
expenses of thelong-distancetraderwere transportation
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the
andmilitary
oftheChineseEmpireoccurred,
political
expansion
a
shift
to
the
of
'new
frontiers
committed
incorporation
government
ofresourcesto theperipheries,
fromthem"(Wong,
notextraction
of
tradition
1997:148)as wasthecaseintheEuropeanmercantilist
and
nation-states
2000).
(Mielants,
city-states
Lastbutnotleast,one ofthereasonswhytheChinesewerenot
a
andimplementing
capableofsystematically
pursuing,
developing,
and
ofsocioeconomic
colonization, exploitasubordination,
strategy
whichdrained
warfare
istheincessant
tionvis-à-vis
thenon-Chinese,
ofimmense
theresources
oftheEmpire,
andmadeChinathetarget
to be
Chinesemilitary
and continuous
destruction,
activity
forcing
1996:
"directed
thanconquest"
atdefenserather
320).This
(Snooks,
in China
times
even
at
but
the
frontiers
incessantwarfarealong
at
whichwerehardly
itselfwasgenerated
bytwocrucialvariables,
about
warfare
in
and
the
devastation
by
brought
play Europe:
nomads(of whichthe Huns,Kitans,Uighurs,
Jurchen,
Tanguts
Xixia,and theMongolsare onlythemostrenowned)forwhom
"Chinawas nearlyalwaysa target"(Reynolds,1961:364; Wang,
on
and incessant
1970a:222) on theone hand,42
peasantuprisings
in Medievaland
theother.The listof massivepeasantrebellions
to
EarlyModernChinaisenormous
(Deng,1999:363-76)compared
in MedievalEurope.The latteris of
the relatively
fewuprisings
nobiloftheWest-European
courserelatedto theoverallweakness
armed
systematic
provoked
ity.The strongChinesestate,however,
rebellions
fromitspeasantswhoweresubjectedto heavytaxation,
whichensuedalsocontribandthevastpolitical
andmilitary
turmoil
in whichmerchants
couldnotplaya significant
utedto a struggle
role.
political
code andjusticein thecourt
1989:97). In addition,"thelackofa reliablecommercial
oflegalprotection
fortheirenterprises"
(Chang,1994:66; Maddideprivedmerchants
theEuropean
within
withtheexistent
son,1998:14).Thisis againincontrast
practices
(North,1991:24-25).
city-states
42McNeillclaimsthatin the
a directlinkexistsbetween
century
earlyfifteenth
in theIndianOcean:
nomadicwarfare
activities
and theendofChinesemaritime
on the groundthatit
sea voyaging
Chineseimperialauthorities
prohibited
diverted
valuableresources
fromthemoreurgenttasksoflanddefenseagainst
frontier
a threatening
nomadpoweracrossthenorthwest
(1992: 111).
underthetrauoccurred
isolation
this:"theMingdynasty's
Linckconfirms
self-imposed
harassments"
ruleandcontinued
maticimpactofMongolianforeign
(1992:
Mongolian
111).
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ofpeasantrebellions
in itselfwasof coursenotan
Repression
since
the
themselves
couldbe
intelligent
policy,
peasantuprisings
that
the
of
mandate
heaven
would
have
been
removed
interpreted
fromtherulingdynasty.
The concernofmitigating
thepossibilities
ofpeasantuprisings
wastherefore
a veryseriousmatter:
canalswere
builtandlargescalecommerce
offoodstuffs
wasencouraged
bythe
authorities
toprevent
famines
andsubsequent
socialunrest(Wong,
1983:248).43Braudelonceclaimedthat"theChinesestateshowed
constant
tothespreadofcapitalism"
due toits"totalitarian
hostility
control"
hastobe modified.
TheChinese
(1977:72).Thisstatement
in anymodernuse of theword.Whatis
statewasnottotalitarian
isthatChinesegovernmental
crucial
officials
commercial
"supported
without
concentrations
of
merchant
wealth"
exchange
promoting
is
therefore
nonsense
to
claim
1997:
It
that
"the
rulers
137).
(Wong,
fromalmostalltheirwestEuropeancounterofMingChinadiffered
in
that
economicgrowth"
theypositively
parts
discouraged
(Bonney,
1995: 3), or that"therole of thestatein Chinaoverallwas not
and facilitating
of
positivewhenitcomesto theactualstimulating
economicgrowth"(Vries,2001: 418), since throughout
history
Chinesestatesupportfora market
and
economic
economy
growth
Thispolicywas,however,
theempire.
wasquitesuccessful
within
not
withtheapprovalof"concentrations
ofwealththrough
synonymous
marketmanipulation"
1999:
theChinese
225).
Essentially,
(Wong,
state"supported
theprinciples
ofmarket
and
exchange soughtto
protectbuyersfrommonopolypower"(Wong,1997: 139), thus
themerchants'
desirestoaccumulate
wealthattheexpense
resisting
of others(Wong,1983:251) as theywereable to do in Europe.44
™ The

policy of preventingpeasant uproars (while exploitingthem as much as
sincea failureto
possible)was thecentralpreoccupationof anyChineseadministration,
do so could (and regularlydid) resultin massivepeasant uprisingswhichmightoverthrowthe dynasty.Moreover,a close examinationof the Imperialbureaucraticsystem
revealsthatsince the lower classes (i.e., peasants) "were able to be representedat all
levelsof thebureaucracy"(Deng, 1999: 67), it is logical thatthe Confucianbureaucrats
allied themselveswith the peasants in an antimerchantcoalition (Deng, 1999: 199).
Furthermore,Chinese agriculturaldevelopmentwas highlysuccessful,and therefore
"increasedland revenuesmade incomefromothersectorsoftheeconomylessnecessary,
[which]reinforcedConfucianprejudicesin favorof agriculture"(Dreyer,1982: 243).
In the Chinese statethe gentrywas alwaysconsiderablymore powerfulthanthe
merchanteliteand thishad a considerableimpacton thewaymerchantswereregarded
ofmerchantswasviewedas having
throughoutsociety.For theChinesestate"enrichment
been achievedat theexpense ofpeasantwelfareand governmentrevenue"(Deng, 1999:
whichhas forcenturies
finance,science,and technology,
96). "Successin trade,industry,
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"The potentially
consequencesof both concentrated
disruptive
wealthand thepursuitof suchwealth"(Wong,1997: 146) which
was
ofa capitalist
cannotbe separated
fromtheconstruction
society,
successfully
opposedin Chinabytherulingstrata.45
CONCLUSIONS
modernization
It maywellbe thecase thattwentieth-century
world-econmodern
the
the
of
looks
capitalist
theory
upon
origins
and
omyas a "naturaloutcome"of economicprocesses although
economists
haveoftenignoredcoercionand fraudas beingemeconomicsuccessin
in understanding
elements
pirically
important
1992:159;Lane,1958:402),as partoftheirattempt
history
(Findlay,
thehistorical
of recurring
at graspingthepreconditions
growth,
1
1999:
ofcapitalism
14).Andpolitical
(Day,
reality
provesotherwise
was
merchant
class,anurban-based
bourgeoisie,
powerfora wealthy
of a capitalist
a sine qua non forthecreationand maintenance
system.46
the
theflow-of-goods,
Of course,thelengthofurbannetworks,
Euto
is
not
of
cities
size
in
or
the
of
division labor cities,
unique
in
size
to
the
can
of
this
none
greatnoncompare
rope. Surely
assessments
Stavrianos's
with
I
to
tend
civilizations.
agree
European
that
inmedievaltimes
Western
Europeancitieswereinsignificant
and
in
both
of
China
or
to
those
India,
population
compared
in volumeof trade.But theywerequiteuniquebecauseof
and politicalpower... as theburtheirgrowing
autonomy
been sociallyesteemed in the west,was viewed in traditionalChina as a secondary
weremade byAbu-Lughod(1989: 332)
achievement"(Ho, 1962: 259). Similarstatements
and Needham (1969: 202).
45 Maddison
praises the Chinese bureaucracy for its "verypositive impact on
agriculture"and refersto theirhostilitytowardsmerchants,but does not elaborateon
the link(1998: 23).
46The existenceof "Chinese
capitalists"(e.g., McNeill,1982:45) does notnecessarily
in thelong run (Gottlieb,
implythe successfulcreationof an endurablecapitalistsystem
1984: 16). Similarly,thefactthatup to thenineteenthcenturylargercitieswerelocated
outsideEurope thanin it(e.g., Baghdad or Beijing)does ofcoursenotimplythatEurope
"remainedinferiorand peripheralto thelargeempiresof theNear East and China until
the late eighteenthcentury"(Chase-Dunn& Grimes,1995: 395).
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townsresources,
acquiredpowerandfinancial
ghers/citizens
to
them
a
charter
could
the
usuallyget king give
royal
people
in
a
commune.
The
commune
them
to
unite
single
licensing
to makeagreements
had therightto act as a corporation;
underitscorporate
seal;tohaveitsowntownhall,courtoflaw
outsideits
anddependent
its
election
[with
territory
systems]
walls(1999:233).
Ifa serfescapedandlivedin a cityfora yearanda daywithout
he becamefree(freeto becomeexploitedby
beingapprehended,
withinthecity,of course);and this
themerchant
entrepreneurs
ofwestern
alteredthestructure
Europeansociety(Rietpossibility
thehistorical
that
it
undermined
1998:
because
133)
cycleof
bergen,
extrabased
on
extortionwhichhad been primarily
tributary
ofthenobility.
economiccoercivepractices
In addition,manypeasantscould,fromthe twelfth
century
on thelord'slandby
reduce,or evenabolishtheirservices
onward,
1990:124-25)47
whichin
payinga fixedsumtothelord(Cherubini,
inflation
because
of
vulnerable
thelongrunmadehimevenmore
ofthe
on thefortune
1998),and thusmoredependent
(Bozorgnia,
class.No wonderthe"noblessede
merchant
urban-based
successful
1997:
robe"datesfromthefourteenth
century
(e.g.,Crouzet-Pavan,
a
1983:68).Bytheearlyfourteenth
16;Blockmans,
century,political
withinEuropehad unfoldedin thelargercities,"within
structure
thathadbeengrudgingly
and executive
whichthelegislative
rights
mercantile
of
elite"(Holt&
in
the
hands
concentrated
were
granted
Rosser,1990:8).
created
ofEuropeancity-states
structure
thispolitical
Ultimately
oftheurbanelitein "nathebackboneforpoliticalrepresentation
alsoknownas Estates,
assemblies
tional"consultative
(parliaments)
1998:
all overthecontinent
thatcameintoexistence
(Rietbergen,
the
135-36;Smith,AlanK., 1991:61-62). Thisstrengthened bar47 In China it was the other
wayaround. In theYuan dynasty,"theactual rentwas
calculatedin percentagesof thecrop yieldratherthanin absoluteamounts-a condition
hardlyconduciveto increasedproduction"(Schurmann,1967: 26). In addition,sincewetin China was much higherthan in drygrain producing
rice agriculturalproductivity
Europe, it is likelythatthiscoincided withhigherlevelsof surplusextractionin China
(Palat & Wallerstein,1999: 25). This maybe anotherexplanatoryvariableof the reason
whythe Chinese state and the Chinese nobilityin the Ming period did not pursue
revenuesfrommaritimeoverseastrade(and conquests) as in Europe.
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In conmerchant
gainingpowerof its(urban-based)
bourgeoisie.
trast,as Rodzinksipointedout,theChinese"politicaland social
structure
didnotfavorthedevelopment
ofcapitalism"
(1979:162).
In myopinionitwasprecisely
of
therelative
poverty theEurolocatedat
the
Chinese
(vis-à-vis
peannobility
geographically
gentry),
theirpolitical
the"fringe"
whichrestricted
oftheEurasianlandmass,
financiers
wasstrucin
credit
and
the
sense
that
their
call
on
power
of
unavoidable.
turally
incapable buildinga large
Beingmilitarily
empire(as in theChinesecase),the"mostcommonandbenefitting
thingto do fora prince,whenin needofcash,wastoborrowfrom
1996:220),whichin turn
histownsor burghers/citizens"
(Uytven,
resultedin theweakening
ofhispoliticalpowerin thelongrun,as
forfinancial
charters
hadtobe giveninreturn
andconcessions
(and
the
urban-based
from
at timesevenpoliticalor military)
support
was
Thelatter
elitesinchargeoftheircity-state
(Blanks,1998:188).48
in theformsofall
oftenconditional:
evermorejuridicalautonomy
taxes(Benekindofprivileges
becamea quidproquo forincreasing
ofattriwars
continuous
In
1993:
the
volo,
60).49 addition, nobility's
declineofthefeudalsystem)
tion(partly
bythelong-term
generated
became
facilitated
thebourgeoisie's
increaseofpower,as city-states
of
criticalagentsin theexisting
Europeanbalance power(Blockmans,1983).
a newimagery
ofnon-European
One shouldavoidconstructing
orientedand demoorientaldespotisms
vs.Europeanfreemarket
craticurbanbased communities
Sivers,1993).It
1984;
(Soullière,
as
a
whole
waslessdesseemsunlikely
thattheEuropeannobility
of
one.50Yet theextremediffusion
poticthanthenon-European
48One should not
in the Low Countriesor in northern
onlythinkof thecity-states
Italy,or in thevariousurban leagues in theHoly Roman Empire,but also of a citysuch
as thirteenth-century
Montpellier:the overlord king "Peter II of Aragon owed the
burghersenormoussumsof moneyin exchangeforwhichhe leftthemfreeto run their
own affairs"(Caille, 1998: 68). As Rosenberg and Birdzell point out, "the common
etymologyof burgherand bourgeois suggeststhe intimateassociationbetweenurbanizationand a lateremergentcapitalism"(1986: 50).
9Because oftheirrelative
weakness,theEuropean nobilityoftenhad to tolerateand
legitimatethemonopolyactivitiesof thewealthiestmerchants,whichis in starkcontrast
withChina (Wong, 1997: 127-33).
50
Chang emphasizes the predatorynature of the Chinese state which meant
merchantscould not continuetheirsuccessfulaccumulationof capitalbeyonda certain
point, since the state would "milkit away" fromthem,thus inhibitingthe growthof
capitalism(1994: 68-73). Whenevertheygot away withit, the European nobilityalso
attempted to confiscatemercantilewealth or defaulton their loans to them (e.g.,
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canbe interpreted
as animportant
inthe
variable
powerinEurope51
Asian
it
was
its
weakness
could
have
sensethat
(anymajor
army
easilybeatenanyEuropeanarmy,whichis whathappenedat the
as Stavrianos
invasionoftheMongols)butalso itsstrength:
(1999)
and Findlay(1992) pointout,no Emperorcouldhaveorderedthe
of theIberianvesselsout of theoceanforthesakeof
withdrawal
were
system
ImperialPolicy.The elitesin chargeof thecity-state
thatfurthered
andimplementing
strategies
capableofconstructing
reinvestments
ofcapital(withsubsequent
theceaselessaccumulation
and
becauseofthenobility's
intheircompanies),
weakness,
division,
The
extortion.52
lackofpowerto adequately
tributary
(re)generate
tothecity-state
andinternal
external
ofthepopulation
exploitation
to feedthecityand to trade
elitewas necessary
byitsmerchant
so
withtheEast,whichmakesthetradeconnections
commodities
important.
andearlyfourteenth
mostofthethirteenth
century,
Throughout
thedivisionoflaborin theEuropeancitiesand theircountryside
inguildsincreased
toexpand.Specialization
continued
unabatedly.

EmperorCharlesV). AlthoughI mustagree withPomeranzthat"it is unclearwhether
big merchantsactuallysufferedmoreexpropriationsthantheirEuropean counterparts"
structureinwesternEurope,
institutional
(2000: 169),itseemsthatbecause ofa different
the European gentrycould do less damage than theirAsian counterparts:some cities
"possessedprivilegesstatingthatthepropertyof theircitizenscould notbe confiscated"
(Dumolyn,2000: 519). In addition,Changmakesthesame case fortheChineseextended
family(as opposed to the Westernnuclearfamily)whichwould have drained precious
revenuesfromthemerchant(1994). But one could easilyreversetheargumentand sum
up the advantagesof extended familyhouseholds. FranklyI thinkit is impossibleto
societies
culturalvalues on different
or collectivistic
assess the impactof individualistic
in the long run. But one should not forgetthatexcessivespendingon nonmercantile
activitiesalso occurredon a large scale in Europe. Not thatthereexistedanythinglike
the betrayalof the bourgeoisiephenomenon,but the emulationof Chang's "parasitic
literatiby the merchantclass" (1994: 71-72) is similarto the emulationof
rent-seeking
the Saint-Simonianparasiticrent-seeking
nobilityby the European merchantclass (cf.
Pomeranz,2000: 170-71). It appears thatin everysocietymerchantsjust had to invest
resourcesin whatBourdieu aptlycoined "social and culturalcapital."
51In thistextI
space carvedout bymerchants,
emphasizethepowerfulinstitutional
but in medieval Europe the Church was at least as powerful.This was also in sharp
contrastwithChina. As Adshead points out, in PlantagenetEngland "15,000 monks
owned betweena quarterand a thirdof the lands, rentsand dues of England [while]
under theT'ang 350,000 monksowned only4% of thecultivatedarea of China" (1995:
forcethatpreventedtheconstructionof
57). Thus, theChurchwas also an institutional
an Empire such as in China (Spruyt,1994).
52It is thusnonsensicalto
claim,as Frankdoes, thata distinctionbetweena world
systemand a worldempirewould be useless or irrelevant(1998: 335).
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atthetimeof
occurred
Yetisita coincidence
thatthesephenomena
thePax MongolicaovertheEurasianlandmass(1250-1350)?The
costsresubstantial
decreaseof transaction
costsand protection
for
western
of
the
market
sultedin an unprecedented
expansion
merchants
Italian
ever
more
in
turnas
which
Europeancity-states,
oflaborinmany
ventured
intoAsia-53increasedthedivision
safely
1999:
urban
industries
45).54
(Ma,
European
tradein theMiddleAges
The international
aspectofthetextile
were
textiles
is sometimes
orunderestimated.
overlooked
However,
market
morevaluablethanspicesin theinternational
sometimes
theexportof
(Malanima,1987:351) andbythefourteenth
century
extent
alsoEastAsia)was
totheMiddleEast(andtoa certain
textiles
lossofbullionto theEast
theconstant
vitalin ordertocompensate
becauseoftheunequalbalanceoftrademaintained
bythewestern
& Udovitch,
Miskimin
1978:
cities
5, 39; Lopez,
(Day,
European
theexportof
1970:110;Deng,1997b:282).In otherwords:without
totheMiddleEastandEastAsia(Lopez,1943:176),wheretextiles
wereinhighdemand(Allsen,
undertheMongols-textiles
especially
1982),the
1997)and oftenservedas meansofexchange(Serruys,
of
bullionflowsto theEastwouldhavecreatedmassiveshortages
in
western
bullion,andimpededintensive
Europe
recurring
growth
for
ever
the
desire
1996:
Adas
&
Thus,
Schwartz,
468).55
(Stearns,
53The
merchantPegolottitestifiedthatthe traderoutesacross
fourteenth-century
Eurasia (fromthe Levant to Peking)were "perfectly
safe,whetherby day or by night"
on
the Black Sea, a merchantwith
cities
Italian
controlled
1965:
From
the
45).
(Lach,
pack asses would takesevento eightmonthsto reachtheChinesecapital(Simkin,1968:
135).
54
Thus, it is erroneous Eurocentrismto claim that "medievaldevelopment"in
(e.g., Delatouche, 1989: 26). The opening
Europe was nothingbut "auto-development"
up oftheEastAsian marketdue to thePax Mongolicawas ofan unprecedentedscale and
(Balard, 1983; Balatier,
provided enormous opportunitiesfor the Westerncity-states
1970: 340). The expansion of textileindustryin the Low Countries,forexample,was
and
interlinked
with"theincreaseddemandforwoolenclothininterregional
intrinsically
internationalcommerce"(Werveke,1954: 237-38). Referenceto the "clothof Tartary"
can be found in Chaucer, Dante, Boccaccio, and manyotherless renownedEuropean
authors(Allsen,1997: 2).
55
one has assumed thatsince theEurasiansilkroutewas an overland
Traditionally,
trade,it cannot have been as importantas maritimetrade and thus its impactswere
probablyminimal.Yet, as Palat and Wallersteinstate,"itis unwarrantedto assume that
land routeswere alwayseclipsed by sea traffic"
(1999: 33). Furthermore,the overland
traderoute to China did not startuntiltheeasternpartof theCaspian Sea since Italian
shipswere activeboth on the Black Sea, theSea of Azov,theriversDon and Volga, and
the Caspian Sea (Richard,1970: 362).
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moreluxuries
fromtheEast,facilitated
bythePaxMongolica,
genurban-based
eratedincentive
the
merchant
eliteto
among European
basedon
ofeconomic"self-sustained
growth"
implement
strategies
and
of
laborers
the
subsecolonialexploitation,
exploitation wage
andexploitation
domination,
subjugation,
quentcommodification,
The
fact
remains
thatinEast
realm(Mielants,
ofthenatural
2000).°6
ofinstitutionalized
werekeptoutsidethestructures
Asiamerchants
was-althoughto a
and thisweakness
powerand decisionmaking,
lesserdegree-also apparentin the EarlyModernIndianOcean
at
ofgrowing
The combination
powerovertheproletariat
region.57
56On
European "medievalcolonialism"see the recentimportantcontributionsby
Balard (1998) and Torro (2000).
57The lackofmerchants'controloverthelabor
(Palat,
processin thetextileindustry
1988: 263), in contrastto mercantilepower in westernEurope, is especiallyrevealing.
lateeighteenth-century
India,presentsconvincingevidencethat
Arasaratnam,in studying
even by thatperiod in timeweaverswho had receivedcash advancesfortheirwork(as
most did) retainedconsiderablecontrolover the productionprocess (1980: 267). This
doctoralstudyofParthasarathi
(1992).
findingwhichis confirmedin thegroundbreaking
In a more recent article,based on his dissertation,Parthasarathisummarizeshis
remarkableconclusions,verypertinentto our argumenthere:
Both [Indian] weaversand merchantswere freeto cancel the contractsat any
time.But whiletheweaverbore no cost forcanceling(he simplyhad to return
hisadvanceifhe canceled
theadvance to themerchant)themerchantforfeited
. . . weaverspossessed thefreedomto acceptadvancesat willand sellcompleted
clothto anybuyer[which]gave [them]greatpower to set clothprices,which,
of contractalso
naturally,
adverselyaffectedmerchantprofits.The asymmetry
made it difficult
formerchantsto enforceclothqualitystandards. . . [and] the
and legallyenforcedsystemsfordebt repaymentmade
lack of institutionalized
formerchantsto recoverdebts(1996: 97).
it extremelydifficult
"merchantswere exIn conclusion,Parthasarathistatesthatin the eighteenth-century
cluded fromthe state withinthe south Indian political order. Unlike manyparts of
Europe wheretheeconomic powerof merchantswas supplementedbypoliticalpower,
in southIndia merchantshad no access to thepowersof thestate"(1996: 98). Even Subrahmanyamand Bayly,themostardentdefendersofSouthAsianpoliticaland economic
dynamismrightup theearlynineteenthcentury,have to admitthatin South Asia "there
is littleevidence to show thatmerchantguilds controlledproductionor definedand
defendedregionsof mercantileactivity
againstrivals"(1988: 406). Hall statesthatunder
the Colas "thereis no evidencethatmerchantsexercisedwage controlsover artisansor
for thatmatterthatproductionstandardswere set or thatfineswere levied forpoor
(1980: 115). Alaviis even more specific:
craftsmanship"
therelationship
betweenthecreditorand theweaverinherentin theIndiansystemis quite distinctfromthatof the puttingout systemin Englandwhere the
merchantwas directlyinvolvedin the purchaseand provisionof materialsand
even equipment(thathe oftenhired)to weavers. . . [whereasin India] withthe
bythemerchantin theorsystemofcashadvancestherewasno suchinvolvement
ganizationof productionand provisionof materialsand equipment(1982: 49).
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unusualalliancebetweenthestateand the
homedue to a highly
revenues
1989:
(Crone,
167)andsubsequent
increasing
bourgeoisie
in
Mediterthe
first
duetoa financial
windfall
bycolonialconquests,
in theNewWorld,as Pomeranzpointsout
ranean,and eventually
werecapable
western
(20Q0),explainswhy
Europeancorecountries
can
ofeventually
worlddomination.
city-states
Although
achieving
be foundon the littoralof the IndianOcean duringthe whole
MiddleAges(Lombard,1988:15;Pearson,1991:70-74),theynever
inwhichmerchants
a transition
toan interstate
system
experienced
the
In
so muchpolitical
retained
(but
power. fact, Europeanprivate
to the
stoodinsharpcontrast
colonialenterprises
statesupported)
more peacefulAsian free marketeconomy(Needham,1970a;
thequalitative
Thomaz,1988:31; Chang,1991b:24).58Therefore,
cannot
intoan interstate
statesystem
froman intercity
shift
system
Withtocapitalism.
fromfeudalism
fromthetransition
be separated
classcouldnot
themerchant
intheemerging
Europeannation-state,
and the
in
the
crucial
to
bureaucracy
posts
onlyaspire occupy
but
administration
(Prak,1992: 192; Glete,2000: 64),59 it could
Althoughthepoliticaland-especiallyfinancial-powerofEarlyModernSouthAsian
"portfoliocapitalists"should not be underestimated(Pomeranz,2000: 175), merchantswho wieldedsignificant
politicalpowershouldbe seen as an exceptionrather
than the rule, as the absence of European-typeputtingout systemsdemonstrate
(Pearson, 1998: 102). Furthercommentson thepathdependenceofSouthAsia can
be foundin Mielants(2002).
58
in the
Subrahmanyampoints out thattherewere plentyof portsand city-states
Indian Ocean regionwhosegovernments
depended on therevenuesderivedfromtrade
and thatoccasionallyeven withinlargerpolitiesmerchantsobtained"access to political
power" (1995: 775). But it is thedegreeto whichAsian merchantscould relyupon their
stateto intervene,whichis important.When Indian merchants'demands forfullcompensationforlosses sufferedat the hands of European pirates"turnedout to be unenforceablebecause of thesuperiornavalstrengthof theEuropean companies"(Prakash,
1979: 47) and because of the disinterestof theirrulers,theyof course attemptedto
withstandthe European onslaughtby a recourseto arms,but eventuallysuccumbedto
European merchantswho could relyon statesupport.As Das Gupta remindsus,
the attitudeof the rulersof Gujarat to sea-warfarecomes out clearlyin the
and of
remarkofSultanBahadurShah that"warsbysea are merchants"affairs,
no concernto theprestigeofkings[indicativeofthefactthat]theGujaratioverseas tradingsystemwas defenseless[as it] lacked adequate naval and political
(1976: 211).
backingin an age of expandingEuropean mercantilism
59This
addressedbothbyPomeranz(2000)
importantthemehas been insufficiently
and hiscritics(e.g., Vries,2002). In EastAsia itwas mainlythegentrywhichwas effectiveand annuities,whereasin
lyincorporatedintothestatestructurewithoffices,functions,
of
were
who
it
was
merchants
urban
capable graftingthemselvesin the power
Europe
structuresof the most importantcapitaliststates(Feuerwerker,1984: 301-16; Isaacs &
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use the mercantile
state'sstrength
to supportits own
regularly
colonialand capitalist
as
these
hadbeenfirmly
practices
strategies,
60
rootedin thepoliciesof medievalcity-states
(Wong,2001: 27).
outin theentireSoutheast
Asian
manyChineseventured
Although
theywere "unlike
regionduringthe Sung and Yuan dynasties,
maritime
merchants
who
were
European
largetraderswithstate
1995:
not
backed
28)
up bytheImperialstateat all
support"(Hui,
Had
1963:172;Wills,1993:87; Pomeranz,
2000:173).61
(Wiethoff,
difficult
Prak,1996). Afterpainstakingly
prosopographicalresearch,Bulstconcludesthat
in late medievalFrance"la plupartdes officiers
royauxétaitissuede la bourgeoisie,particulièrementles lieutenantset les receveurs"(1996: 115). Accordingto Brady,"already
in thelate 15thcenturyEmperorMaximilianfavoredburghersovernobles in his administration"(1997: 249). See also Hoppenbrouwers(2001: 59) and Dumolyn(2001: 83-84).
60Merchant
ofthedecisivechangethattook
capitalismwas "an essentialpreliminary
(Goody, 1996: 223) whichin turn
place withthe adventof European industrialization"
widened thegap betweentheWestand thenon-West.This does not implythatEurope
was the "onlyactivemakerin history"(Washbrook,1990: 492) since the technological
and commerciallinkwithAsia was crucialforits development.While one should pay
of existing"colonial models" (Subrahmanyam,1988: 139),
attentionto the multiplicity
were"disruptedand dismantledin favorof the
and payattentionto howlocal structures
increasinghegemonyof Europe" (Perlin, 1983: 90), while keeping in mind how the
different
"natureof statesand societies in the externalarena made a big differencein
termsof how theyresponded to Europeans" (Pearson, 1988: 31), thepoint is thaiprior
to theIndustrialRevolution-accordingto Pearson(1988: 45) longbefore1750- Asia was
on the road of peripheralizationas "European companiesbegan to assume an increasinglydominantrole,graduallysubvertingtheAsian tradingnexusand local Asian economies to an internationaldivisionoflabor and commoditycircuitscenteredin Western
resultedin "theirmaritimeeconomies
Europe itself (Perlin,1983: 60). This ultimately
inAsia"(Perlin,1983:90).
increasingly
imposingtheirwill,leadingto de-industrialization
One of the questions I wantedto address is: whydid Europe eventuallydominateand
colonize almosttheentireEurasianlandmass(a processwhichlastedfromthesixteenth
consequences to its own "path of
throughthe nineteenthcenturies),withfar-reaching
development,"whilethefarsuperiorEarlyModernAsianpowersdid notattemptto pursue such a strategy?
The inter(city)statecompetitionforcommercialroutesand access
to as well as dominationof markets(the hegemonyover the space of flowsas well as
claimsovera wide rangeof areas wherevertheirpowercould not be
outrightterritorial
resisted)inauguratedthedominationof theOceans in thelong run.Outrightterritorial
notionssuch as theMareBritannicum
speak forthemselves(Mollat,1988: 16). Indeed, in
the late fifteenth-century
King HenryVII of England gaveJohn Cabot the advice to
"discover,explore,conquer,occupyand takeintopossession"all thelandshe would find
missionthanZhengHe got fromEmperor
overseas(Mollat, 1988: 17), quite a different
Yung-lo.
61That "the
entreprequalitieswe associatewithcommercialactivities,risk-taking,
neurial activities,the search for foreign markets,the mobilityand the desire to
accumulateand reinvest,
werewidelydistributed[throughout
Asia] and cannotbe looked
upon in the frameworkof European developmentsalone" (Goody, 1996: 222), is selfevident.But thisis not thesame thingas being a professionalmerchantwho can on the
one hand use the advantagesof statepower on the one hand (by externalizingcertain
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lackedthisstatesupportas well,"theywould
Europeanmerchants
insomeof
withAsiantraders
haveprobably
connections
established
inthenetwork
ofemporia
themajoremporiaandthusparticipated
trade"(Rothermund,
1991:7),butwithstatesupportbehindthem,
wereable to actquitedifferthePortuguese
and Dutchmerchants
Thisdifferent
bythefundamentally
ently.62
policycanbe explained
betweenChinaand western
socialstructure
different
hierarchical
Europewasthecradle
Europe,whichcanshedlightonwhywestern
in spiteofallitslesserachievements.
ofcapitalism,

and on theotherhand have sufficient
costs such as protectionrenton thenation-state)
freedom(e.g., by institutionaland legal protection)fromstates and rulers.The full
forexample,wasinhibitedin China
developmentofmodernbankingand creditfacilities,
whichprotectedwealthfromthe
because of "thelack of a legal and politicalframework
state itselfand some of its rapacious officials"(Wang, 1970a: 222). That said, due to
China's power it may have been plausible that if eventsin East Asia had occurred
differently
"Europe could have become verymuch a peripheryof a systemcenteredin
Asia" (Fitzpatrick,1992: 513), but not partof a capitalistone.
62
Indeed, unlike China the Portuguesestate"promotedoverseas trade and gave
incentivesto its subjectsto participatein it" (Ptak, 1994: 44). Ptakdoes not hesitateto
call the Portuguesestate "a kind of huge entrepreneurialinstitutionwhichwanted to
improveits position in internationaltrade and politicsby establishingthe Eastado da
India" (1994: 44-45). Ironically,the Portuguesestatewas in the long run not the real
control
benefactorofitsactivitiesin Asia after"royalbankruptciesand debtstransferred
of exchequerand tradeto foreignmerchant-bankers"
(Pearson, 1988: 34). These werenotsurprisinglyGenoese capitalistswho attemptedto outflankthejoint Venetian-Mamlukmonopolyover traderoutesto East Asia byfinancingthePortugueseexplorationof
the Atlantic(Unger, 1997: 513). What is importantto note is that the Portuguese
methodsof colonizationand subjugationrepresenteda continuationof Italianpractices
in theMediterranean(Pearson,1991: 106; Scammell,1981).The wayEuropean merchant
capitalistscould combineeconomic and politicalpower to theiradvantageis in striking
contrastwiththenon-western
European powersthathad access to theIndianOcean. The
Karimimerchants,who duringthelate Middle Ages probablyaccumulatedmuchmore
wealththan theirEuropean counterpartsin controllingthe profitablemaritimetrade
fromEgyptto South Asia, are a good example.Their lack of politicalpower,not their
marvelouscapacitiesto accumulatecapital,was theirundoingin thelong run(Arenson,
1996: 117) as the Egyptianstate,whichwas not under theircontrol,eventuallyturned
and at times
againstthem(Labib, 1970: 214; Fischel,1958: 172-73). The unwillingness
and Ming
Mamluk
maritime
of
several
non-western
Egypt
powers (e.g.,
impossibility
China) to back up theiroverseas merchants,enabled the weak and puny European
powersto occupy"smallpostsofcommercialand defensivepotentialat selectedstrategic
pointsall along thecoasts of theIndian Ocean" (Keswani,1970: 544). These incrementally small steps were, to the disbeliefof the great landbased empires of Asia, but a
prelude to worlddomination.
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